Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control by Sarah Valentine
Fordham Urban Law Journal
Volume 46
Number 2 Artificial Intelligence and Predictive
Algorithms: Why Big Data Can Lead To Big Problems
Article 4
2019
Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided
Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social
Control
Sarah Valentine
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Fordham Urban Law Journal by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more
information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.
Recommended Citation
Sarah Valentine, Impoverished Algorithms: Misguided Governments, Flawed Technologies, and Social Control, 46 Fordham Urb. L.J. 364
(2019).
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ulj/vol46/iss2/4
 364 
IMPOVERISHED ALGORITHMS:  
MISGUIDED GOVERNMENTS, FLAWED 
TECHNOLOGIES, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 
 
Sarah Valentine* 
ABSTRACT 
This Article posits that governments deploy algorithms as social 
control mechanisms to contain and criminalize marginalized 
populations.  Though recognition of the dangers inherent in misuse of 
big data and predictive analytics is growing, governments and scholars 
alike have not paid sufficient attention to how these systems 
inevitably target the poor, the disabled, and communities of color.  As 
the criminal justice and social welfare systems have become fused, big 
data analytics increases the breadth of government control over those 
caught within these overlapping systems.  Challenging governmental 
use of algorithms as instruments of social control requires 
understanding the fallibility of the technology, the historical and 
political forces driving adoption of the technology, and the strategies 
that have been most effective in advocating against it.  It also requires 
recognizing that the technological capacity to control and punish 
includes, but also expands far beyond, uses by law enforcement. 
This Article discusses the most problematic aspects of 
governmental use of big data and artificial intelligence.  These include 
issues of governmental malfeasance, system capacity for masking 
encoded bias, technological alteration of policy, the ceding of political 
decisions to private developers, and systemic data error.  It then 
examines the social and political forces driving governmental 
deployment of data analytics.  It concludes by examining litigation, 
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regulatory, and organizing strategies that can be used to challenge 
governmental employment of algorithmic social control mechanisms. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Governments at all levels, from the local to the federal, are 
increasing their reliance on algorithmic decision-making 
technologies.1  Helpful as algorithms may be, they inevitably target 
marginalized populations and exacerbate the social stratification and 
vast inequality that already exists in our society.  Simply put, 
algorithms are mathematical processes for solving defined problems.2  
Algorithmic decision-making technologies encompass a wide variety 
 
 1. Algorithmic decision-making is the use of algorithms to either assist human 
decision-making or, now more commonly, to make decisions without human 
intervention. See Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1249, 1252 (2008). 
 2. While “algorithm” is a term with a highly technical definition, scholars have 
generalized the definition as a computational procedure for solving a specifically 
defined task or problem. See Joshua A. Kroll et al., Accountable Algorithms, 165 U. 
PA. L. REV. 633, 640 n.14 (2017) (detailing observations by a host of well-known 
scholars in the field of technology and the law, including Joanna Huey, Solon 
Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. Reidenberg, David G. Robinson, and Harlan 
Yu). 
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of big-data analytic systems,3 including predictive analytics4 and 
machine learning.5  As these technologies grow more and more 
sophisticated, human decision-making in the areas of criminal justice, 
public benefits, and child welfare is rapidly being replaced by 
technologies that few understand and many in positions of power 
mistakenly believe are infallible.6  When deployed to control and 
contain vulnerable populations, these systems dehumanize the people 
they target and impoverish standards of due process and justice. 
Public awareness of the potential dangers that arise from misuse of 
big data is increasing,7 and legal academia has begun to grapple with 
how this technology upends civil rights and privacy.8  However, 
current discussions tend to elide how these algorithmic technologies 
 
 3. Big data analytics is the increased computational analysis possible from the 
application of advanced algorithms to increasingly large data sets. See David Lehr & 
Paul Ohm, Playing with the Data: What Legal Scholars Should Learn About 
Machine Learning, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 653, 669 (2017). 
 4. Predictive analytics is the use of complex algorithms to predict future 
behavior through analyzing large data sets. See I. Glenn Cohen & Harry S. Graver, 
Cops, Docs, and Code: A Dialogue Between Big Data in Health Care and Predictive 
Policing, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 437, 438 (2017). 
 5. Machine learning algorithms are not programmed to complete a specifically 
defined task, but rather to learn to solve more indeterminate problems — to develop 
additional algorithms without additional programming. See Andrew Tutt, An FDA 
for Algorithms, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 83, 85 (2017); see also Robert D. Helfand, Big 
Data and Insurance: What Lawyers Need to Know and Understand, 21 J. INTERNET 
L. 1, 6 (2017) (explaining that machine learning programs revise their instructions 
based on correlations that human programmers may not have considered). 
 6. See generally ANDREW GUTHRIE FERGUSON, THE RISE OF BIG DATA 
POLICING: SURVEILLANCE, RACE, AND THE FUTURE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017) 
[hereinafter THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING] (discussing predictive policing 
technology in the criminal justice system); VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING 
INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND PUNISH THE POOR 
(2017) (detailing technologically enhanced governmental control over the poor in 
social and family services). 
 7. See generally CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION, HOW BIG 
DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY (2016).  Even with 
increased attention, much of the public remains unaware of the capacity for 
surveillance and manipulation big data analytics provides. See SAFIYA UMOJA 
NOBLE, ALGORITHMS OF OPPRESSION: HOW SEARCH ENGINES REINFORCE RACISM 
51–54 (2018). 
 8. See, e.g., Solon Barocas & Andrew D. Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 
104 CALIF. L. REV. 671 (2016) (discussing Title VII’s inability to address 
discrimination arising from employer’s data mining enhanced decision making); 
Michael L. Rich, Machine Learning, Automated Suspicion Algorithms, and the 
Fourth Amendment, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 871 (2016) (arguing that machine learning to 
predict individual criminality may shift reasonable suspicion determinations to 
predictive algorithms); Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: 
Toward a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93 (2014) 
(arguing existing privacy protections are inadequate to address big data’s harms). 
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increasingly become tools of social control, used to maintain rigid and 
historical demarcations of class and race.  For example, while police 
officers have long had the ability to use their own judgment to decide 
if there is the articulable suspicion necessary to stop and frisk 
someone,9 today that articulable suspicion may be guided by an 
algorithm that neither the police officer nor anyone else in the police 
department understands or can explain.10  Similarly, while 
caseworkers have always had to make decisions about whether or not 
a family qualifies for public benefits or whether there is sufficient risk 
of harm to remove a child,11 now those decisions are guided and 
sometimes determined by opaque and inexplicable predictive 
analytics.12 
Although individual decisions made by police officers or 
caseworkers can be biased or wrong, those decisions are traceable to 
an individual actor in particular circumstances.  Individual decisions 
can be disputed in court, with those affected able to challenge the 
circumstances or evidence the police officer or caseworker relied on.  
Big data analytics is altering how these kinds of governmental 
decisions are made and this, in turn, weakens the ability for those 
harmed to effectively challenge those decisions.  Big data systems are 
often touted as more cost efficient and objective methods of 
governmental decision-making concerning vulnerable populations.13  
However, this focus on efficiency only glorifies savings over proper 
services, and the belief that hyper-surveillance and predictive 
analytics can solve deep issues of bias and discrimination is misguided 
at best. 
We live in a country that consigns a large part of its population to 
an underclass, a permanently marginalized group contained, 
controlled, and criminalized purportedly for the protection of 
everyone else.14  Over the past several decades, government has 
 
 9. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). 
 10. See infra Section I.B. 
 11. See, e.g., Lauren Huber Martin, Comment, Caseworker Liability for the 
Negligent Handling of Child Abuse Reports, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 191, 195–96 (1991) 
(describing typical responsibility of child protection case worker investigating an 
allegation of neglect or abuse). 
 12. See infra Section I.B. 
 13. Citron, supra note 1, at 1252–53 (discussing how the automation of benefits 
decision-making systems are seen as more efficient and consistent); EUBANKS, supra 
note 6, at 33 (discussing how the computerization of benefits systems as neutral tools 
can reduce public spending). 
 14. See Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the 
Emerging Strategy of Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 467–68 
(1992). 
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coercively leveraged the welfare, foster care, prison, and deportation 
systems to control residents of neighborhoods devastated by the 
systemic withdrawal of public resources.15  When these vulnerable 
populations seek assistance, the state they encounter not only often 
fails to support them, but it also actively targets them with punitive 
social control mechanisms.16  The criminal justice and social welfare 
systems are now fused to better control and contain marginalized 
populations such as the poor, the disabled, and communities of 
color.17 
What happens when government introduces algorithmic decision-
making systems into an already repressive environment?  It increases 
its capacity to dominate vulnerable communities by making it almost 
impossible to challenge system errors.18  It reinforces historical 
discrimination by relying on inaccurate and biased data.19  It further 
destroys our country’s already meager social safety net by ceding 
more regulatory power to private companies whose focus is profit.20  
Most dangerously, it allows governments to hide these negative 
effects behind the veneer of technological infallibility. 
Technology is not neutral, and governmental reliance on big data 
analytics has the capacity to further erode fundamental relationships 
between the governing and the governed.21  Unchecked 
governmental use of algorithms as social control mechanisms22 is 
 
 15. Dorothy Roberts, Prison, Foster Care, and the Systemic Punishment of Black 
Mothers, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1474, 1477–78 (2012).  The criminalization of poverty 
extends further into communities as the collateral consequences of mass 
incarceration effect entire neighborhoods. See Ann Cammett, Shadow Citizens: 
Felony Disenfranchisement and the Criminalization of Debt, 117 PENN ST. L. REV. 
349, 366 (2012) (noting that disenfranchisement affects communities through vote 
dilution and economic displacement from the redistribution of federal resources). 
 16. Wendy A. Bach, The Hyperregulatory State: Women, Race, Poverty, and 
Support, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 317, 318–19 (2014). 
 17. Id. at 334–36 (describing the state’s targeting of poor, urban, communities of 
color as intentional). 
 18. See infra Sections I.B. and II.A. 
 19. See infra Section I.C. 
 20. See infra Section II.C. 
 21. Torin Monahan, Questioning Surveillance and Security, in SURVEILLANCE 
AND SECURITY: TECHNOLOGICAL POLITICS AND POWER IN EVERYDAY LIFE 10 (2006) 
(“Technologies are neither separate from society nor are they neutral 
tools . . . [i]nstead [they] are part of the social problems they are intended to 
correct.”); see also Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. 
REV. 1934, 1953–54 (2013) (discussing how state surveillance affects the power 
dynamic between “the watcher and the watched”). 
 22. Advanced algorithms and AI systems can, of course, be greatly beneficial.  It 
is governmental deployment of these technologies as social control mechanisms this 
Article critiques.  Technologically similar systems can be used for vastly different 
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dangerous to many of our core democratic beliefs about due process 
and equality, especially when the technology is used to target already 
marginalized populations. Governmental adoption of these 
technologies is inherently political, not only because it impacts the use 
of governmental resources, but also because it reinforces some of the 
worst aspects of our current justice system.  Big data analytics 
provides the state a degree of control over marginalized populations 
that is unrivaled in American history.23  To confront the increasingly 
authoritarian application of big data analytics, progressive lawyers, 
policymakers, and advocates must not only understand the 
technology and how it reinforces oppression, but also must engage 
with the socioeconomic forces that drive governments to adopt 
technological systems of social control. 
The layering of algorithms on top of the already complex social 
structures underpinning our problematic justice system may seem like 
a significant shift in practice to those of us not steeped in technology.  
However, no matter how complex the mathematics, these systems are 
less revolutionary than they are the logical evolution of past strategies 
that governments have used to control marginalized people.24  Thus, 
many of the tools used to challenge governmental overreach in the 
past provide the foundations with which to oppose big data analytics 
— algorithms of social control themselves, both impoverished and 
impoverishing. 
This Article discusses various aspects of how and why governments 
use algorithmic decision-making systems as a mechanism of social 
control.  It also explores potential avenues of resistance before 
government reliance on these systems becomes unassailable.  Part I 
addresses issues of governmental malfeasance in implementing big 
data technologies and discusses how the systemic flaws in the 
deployment of seemingly “objective” tools can do harm to vulnerable 
populations.  Part II discusses some of the prominent sociopolitical 
factors driving governmental adoption of big data technologies. 
 
purposes.  See, e.g., Allison J. Pugh, Automated Health Care Offers Freedom from 
Shame, but Is It What Patients Need?, NEW YORKER (May 22, 2018), 
https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/automated-health-care-offers-freedom-
from-shame-but-is-it-what-patients-need/amp [https://perma.cc/RM6A-PW7K] 
(describing similar systems where individuals interact with artificial intelligence, one 
developed to provide low income patients assistance returning home from the 
hospital and another developed to assist Homeland Security in interrogations). 
 23. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 200. 
 24. Id. at 37 (describing data analytics targeting the poor and working class as an 
“expansion and continuation of moralistic and punitive poverty management 
strategies existing since the 1820’s”). 
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Finally, Part III considers how litigation, regulation, and political 
activism can be combined to address the harms caused by 
governmental deployment of these systems. 
I.  NEW TOOLS BUILT ON PAST PREJUDICE 
Governments have always relied on the surveillance technology of 
the day.25  Historically, the burdens of surveillance have fallen 
hardest on poor and marginalized populations.26  Still, the wholesale 
adoption of big data analytics is unique,27 even as it shares troubling 
historical roots with government use of other technologies.  
Unprecedented levels of public and private surveillance28 have 
created what is commonly called “big data,”29 an almost 
unfathomable amount of searchable and sharable data on every 
individual and community in the country. 
The sheer amount of collected data from hyper-surveillance is 
stunning, but it is the analytics that weaponizes this information, 
allowing governments to “profile, police, and punish the poor.”30  
 
 25. See generally JEREMY BLACK, THE POWER OF KNOWLEDGE: HOW 
INFORMATION AND TECHNOLOGY MADE THE MODERN WORLD (2014) (reviewing 
historical governmental use of information and technology from the fall of the 
Mongolian empire through the rise of big data). 
 26. Kimani Paul-Emile, Blackness as Disability?, 106 GEO. L.J. 293, 340–42 (2018) 
(describing police profiling and systematic surveillance as social control mechanisms 
that disproportionately target black populations); see also Nathalie Maréchal, First 
They Came for the Poor: Surveillance of Welfare Recipients as an Uncontested 
Practice, 33 MEDIA & COMM. 56 (2015) (describing persistent governmental 
surveillance of poor and low-income Americans). 
 27. See Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2219 (2018) (describing the 
amount of searchable data available to law enforcement, in this case cell-site records, 
as caused by “seismic shifts in digital technology”). 
 28. Data collection is a form of surveillance, and the current scope of this 
surveillance is unprecedented. See Richards, supra note 21, at 1936.  The level of 
surveillance today is so immense that it necessitates a parsing of the concept. See 
Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, The Smart Fourth Amendment, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 
547, 551, 551 n.15 (2017) (describing “sensorveillance” as the “ever increasing ability 
for surveillance technologies to track individuals through the data trails they leave 
behind,” and indicating the term was inspired by the concept of “dataveillance” used 
to “describe the systematic observation, collation, and dissemination that modern 
computing make possible”). 
 29. There is no uniform definition of “big data,” though in general it is recognized 
as the aggregation of massive amounts of information in digital format to increase 
analytic capacity to search and sort. See, e.g., Mary Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, 
and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 
53, 64 (2017) (describing big data as “the collection, aggregation, analysis, and use of 
mass amounts of digital information gathered and shared about individuals”). 
 30. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 38.  “Policing” is used to capture all the ways the 
government forcefully attempts to regulate and manage the poor, regardless of 
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Advances in computational science have created the ability to 
capture, collect, and combine everyone’s digital trails and analyze 
them in ever-finer detail.31  It is this merging of big data with 
advanced analytics that facilitates social control through algorithmic 
decision-making systems.  As political scientist, data scholar, and 
activist Virginia Eubanks explains: 
Forty years ago, nearly all of the major decisions that shape our lives 
— whether or not we are offered employment, a mortgage, 
insurance, credit, or a government service — were made by human 
beings.  They often used an actuarial process that made them think 
more like computers than people, but human discretion still ruled 
the day.  Today, we have ceded much of that decision-making power 
to sophisticated machines.  Automated eligibility systems, ranking 
algorithms, and predictive risk models control which neighborhoods 
get policed, which families attain needed resources, who is short-
listed for employment, and who is investigated for fraud.32 
But algorithmic decision-making, built on imperfect science and 
implemented using terribly flawed data sets, is generally hidden, 
opaque, and unknowable — thus often unchallengeable, making it a 
stealth weapon of social control governments find hard to resist.33  
Limiting the harmful effects of big data analytics requires advocates 
to recognize the political implications of these systems.  It also 
requires an understanding of just how much can, and does, go wrong 
with algorithmic decision-making technology.  From government 
malfeasance in adopting and implementing the technology, to the 
problematic analytics and inaccurate data inherent in their design, the 
flaws are serious, systemic, and most often ignored. 
A.  Government Malfeasance 
This section explores the ways in which government administrators 
purchase and implement big data systems — often without 
understanding how the technology impacts policy, without providing 
regulatory oversight, and without accurately informing the public 
about whether or how the systems are functioning.  Problems arise 
from the fact that merely implementing algorithmic decision-making 
is dangerous, regardless of the technology used.  Translating complex 
 
whether it is done explicitly by law enforcement or through threats to remove access 
to food, shelter, or one’s children. See id. at 215. 
 31. See THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 109–12 (describing 
data collection and data mining techniques). 
 32. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 3. 
 33. See infra notes 62–70 and accompanying text. 
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policy into computer code alters the policy itself,34 often harming the 
communities governed by the policy or regulations.35  Additionally, 
automating complex regulatory systems by operation delegates 
legislative power to that system and its programmers.36  As one 
commentator explained, “[t]ranslating powerful, complex ideas into 
the language of algorithms and machine learning protocols is the 
mother of all statutory drafting and interpretation problems.”37 
Even in fairly simple systems, coding errors can have disastrous 
effects.  For example, New York City’s automated benefits system 
was developed to guide caseworkers in determining eligibility for 
various benefits.38  The system failed to list an option for the 
immigration status for “battered qualified alien,” thereby denying 
benefits to an entire class of immigrant women fleeing domestic 
violence.39  The errors embedded in the New York City system are 
not unusual, and similarly harmful errors continue to surface across 
the country as more states adopt algorithmic decision-making 
technologies.40 
Most government administrators implementing big data systems do 
not have the capacity to understand them and cannot explain them.  
The systems remain opaque, a “mysterious ‘black box’ impervious to 
 
 34. Citron, supra note 1, at 1261. 
 35. Id. at 1268–71 (describing how coding failures altered regulations in the 
Colorado, California, and Texas public benefits systems, negatively affecting 
thousands of recipients). 
 36. Id. at 1295 (noting that because the defects that occur during coding of policy 
or rules are hidden, agencies fail to provide procedural safeguards typically applied in 
rulemaking). 
 37. Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, A Simpler World? On Pruning Risks and 
Harvesting Fruits in an Orchard of Whispering Algorithms, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
27, 36 (2017). 
 38. M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 39. Id. at 413.  New York’s automated benefits system also failed to include a 
complete listing of the documents that could support an applicant’s eligibility, and 
demanded documentation that was not required by law. Id. 
 40. See, e.g., Citron, supra note 1, at 1268 (“[F]rom September 2004 to April 2007, 
code writers embedded over nine hundred incorrect rules into Colorado’s public 
benefits system.  With one such incorrect rule, CBMS [Colorado Benefits 
Management System] denied Medicaid to patients with breast and cervical cancer 
based on income and asset limits that were not authorized by federal or state law.”).  
In 2016, Arkansas implemented an algorithmic assessment program for disabled 
Medicaid patients that included coding errors, mistakenly reducing benefits for 
recipients with diabetes and cerebral palsy. See Colin Lecher, What Happens When 
An Algorithm Cuts Your Health Care, VERGE (Mar. 21, 2018, 9:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/3/21/17144260/healthcare-medicaid-algorithm-
arkansas-cerebral-palsy [https://perma.cc/55ZZ-RWFP]. 
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challenge.”41  In 2011, the Houston Independent School System 
began using a privately developed algorithmic decision-making 
system to terminate teachers.42  During litigation, the school district 
could not explain the algorithm’s outputs and refused to provide 
information about the algorithm itself, arguing that it did not have 
“custody, control or possession” of the technology.43  The school 
district also admitted that it ceded all teacher evaluations to the 
algorithm’s developer and did not verify or audit the scores the 
algorithm provided.44 
This ceding of authority to the developers is common,45 and the 
results are often spectacularly awful for those governed by the system.  
For example, the Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency used 
outside contractors to develop the Michigan Integrated Data 
Automated System (MiDAS).46  A completely automated system, 
MiDAS made determinations of unemployment fraud 
algorithmically, with absolutely no human review.47  It also had a 
ninety-three percent error rate.48  MiDAS was so problematic that a 
federal trial court granted a non-profit legal service provider standing 
 
 41. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 
3d 1168, 1179 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 42. Id. at 1171. 
 43. Id. at 1177 n.28. 
 44. Id. at 1177. 
 45. Id.; see also M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) 
(discussing how an inaccurate code denied benefits to immigrants seeking assistance 
in domestic violence cases); Citron, supra note 1, at 1309 (describing coding errors 
that denied benefits to cancer patients); infra note 152 and accompanying text 
(describing a code that automatically terminated benefits for failure to provide 
certain documentation, regardless of fault). 
 46. Ryan Felton, Criminalizing the Unemployed, DETROIT METRO TIMES (July 1, 
2015), https://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/criminalizing-the-
unemployed/Content?oid=2353533 [https://perma.cc/E6YH-8Q44]. 
 47. Robert M. Charette, Michigan’s MiDAS Unemployment System: Algorithm 
Alchemy Created Lead, Not Gold, IEEE SPECTRUM (Jan. 24, 2018, 5:00 PM), 
https://spectrum.ieee.org/riskfactor/computing/software/michigans-midas-
unemployment-system-algorithm-alchemy-that-created-lead-not-gold 
[https://perma.cc/9VX7-TLW9]; see also Zynda v. Arwood, 2016 WL 4593828, at *1–2 
(E.D. Mich. Sept. 2, 2016) (denying Michigan’s Motion to Dismiss, which argued that 
the case should be thrown out on the grounds that it implemented human review and 
ceased use of the MiDAS system).  Training materials provided by Michigan 
reportedly stated: “Regardless of the manner in which the information is gathered, 
maintained, or processed, all UI functions are ultimately performed by MiDAS.” Ted 
Roleofs, Broken: The Human Toll of Michigan’s Unemployment Fraud Saga, 
BRIDGE (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.bridgemi.com/public-sector/broken-human-toll-
michigans-unemployment-fraud-saga [https://perma.cc/69JW-KAHE]. 
 48. Roleofs, supra note 47. 
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to challenge the State’s deployment of the algorithmic tool.49  The 
court found that MiDAS’s error rate was so high that it forced the law 
office to divert significant resources to handling the claims, which 
amounted to injury sufficient to grant standing.50 
Shifting the power to determine policy to computer programmers is 
inherently problematic from the perspective of democratic 
governance.  But it is also important to recognize to whom this power 
is shifted.  Tech fields have historically excluded women, black, and 
Latinx individuals.51  This exclusion practically insures that the 
developers building the algorithms governments will use to control 
marginalized communities will not include individuals from those 
communities.52  In other words, the people making programming 
choices that alter government policy work from a perspective that 
lacks the cultural awareness of those the technology most directly 
affects.  Beyond this collective problem of nonrepresentation, it is 
also unfortunately likely that individual programmers will eschew any 
responsibility for how the technology is ultimately used.53 
Governments also fail to test the systems they purchase prior to 
implementation.54  This lack of due diligence is especially 
troublesome as more information about system bias and fallibility 
 
 49. Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 804 (E.D. Mich. 2016). 
 50. Id. at 805–06 (grant of standing to nonprofit law firm because number and 
opaqueness of the fraud claims generated by MiDAS system). 
 51. NOBLE, supra note 7, at 64–65. 
 52. Id. 
 53. AARON RIEKE ET AL., UPTURN, OPEN SOC’Y FOUND., DATA BROKERS IN AN 
OPEN SOCIETY 43 (2016), 
https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/data-brokers-in-an-open-
society-20161121.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAU4-56UR] (“An occupational hazard of 
becoming a technology expert is that one risks losing touch with the animating 
concerns of social justice.”).  This is not an overblown concern, as illustrated by this 
particular incident: a programmer working on technology to retroactively determine 
whether someone was a gang member was asked about the potential for someone 
being mistakenly identified as a gang member because of biased training data. See 
Matthew Hutson, Artificial Intelligence Could Identify Gang Crimes — and Ignite an 
Ethical Firestorm, SCI. MAG. (Feb. 28, 2018, 8:00 AM), 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/02/artificial-intelligence-could-identify-gang-
crimes-and-ignite-ethical-firestorm [https://perma.cc/7YTZ-DQP6].  The 
programmer denied any responsibility, claiming he could not be sure how the system 
would be used and that he was “just an engineer.” Id.  In another instance, a 
developer of the algorithm used in Arkansas to assign Medicaid benefits argued that 
the lack of transparency in the system was not problematic, because “at some point, 
you’re going to have to trust me that a bunch of smart people determined this is the 
smart way to do it.” Lecher, supra note 40. 
 54. Citron, supra note 1, at 1272. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 375 
becomes available.55  To make matters worse, government agencies 
often refuse to concede when predictive technologies are failing,56 
sometimes going so far as to threaten government employees who 
raise concerns about the technology.57  In addition to these 
technology-specific issues, there are the more mundane ethical lapses 
common to public-private contracting.  Predictive algorithms are 
expensive and the stakes for individual companies are high.58  This 
leads to public procurement with little or no competitive bidding,59 
and unsavory, if not illegal, relationships between government 
officials and the companies from who they purchase.60 
 
 55. See infra Sections II.B. and II.C.  Not only is there more information about 
issues with the technology, there are also suggested solutions that states seem 
determined to overlook. See, e.g., Danielle Ensign et al., Runaway Feedback Loops 
in Predictive Policing, 81 PROC. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 10 (2018), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1706.09847.pdf [https://perma.cc/NQD8-JWQF] (showing ease of 
modifying PredPol predictive policing system to minimize its asymmetrical feedback 
loop that continues to send police into areas based on the technology, not the actual 
crime rate); Elaine Angelino et al., Learning Certifiable Optimal Rule Lists for 
Categorical Data, 19 J. MACHINE LEARNING RES. 1, 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1704.01701.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F5P-X88J] (developing a 
transparent algorithmic decision-making system for recidivism prediction that work 
as well as the COMPAS non-transparent and proprietary system). 
 56. See M.K.B. v. Eggleston, 445 F. Supp. 2d 400, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting 
that despite high-level awareness of the problems with the system “no meaningful 
corrective action was taken”); see also Citron, supra note 1, at 1269 n.133 (discussing 
how despite knowledge of system errors that incorrectly applied income limits to 
women with breast or cervical cancer, administrators delayed fixing the system “for 
years”). 
 57. Paul Eagon, Judges Feel Pressured After Blasting Michigan Jobless Agency, 
DETROIT FREE PRESS (July 2, 2017, 7:14 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/07/02/judges-michigan-jobless-
agency/423502001/ [https://perma.cc/7ERT-GUXH] (reporting pressure placed on 
administrative law judges who were critical of the MiDAS system). 
 58. See Elizabeth E. Joh, The Undue Influence of Surveillance Technology 
Companies on Policing, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 101, 114–16 (2017) (describing Taser’s 
attempt to monopolize the police body camera market). 
 59. See, e.g., David Gelles, Taser International Dominates the Police Body 
Camera Market, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/business/taser-international-dominates-the-
police-body-camera-market.html [https://perma.cc/CDR5-PQSJ] (describing 
investigations into cities entering into no bid contracts with Taser). 
 60. Id. (noting the pattern of police chiefs being hired by Taser as consultants).  
The Director of the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services resigned 
amid ethical concerns which included no bid contract for a company selling a 
predictive analytics system. See Nancy Smith, Illinois Dumps George Sheldon’s 
‘Failed’ Predictive Analytics Program, SUNSHINE STATE NEWS (Dec. 7, 2017, 6:00 
AM), http://sunshinestatenews.com/story/illinois-dumps-george-sheldons-eckerd-
kids-failed-predictive-analytics-program [https://perma.cc/5XPD-RV3W]. 
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Governments could address at least some of the concerns described 
above by increasing transparency and providing ample opportunities 
for public input prior to purchasing big data systems.61  
Unfortunately, most governments are less than forthcoming about 
adopting these technologies.  Some jurisdictions go as far as deploying 
predictive algorithms in secret, especially in the policing arena.  In 
Baltimore, the police department used data from a program that 
provided aerial surveillance footage for months, without ever 
reporting it to the mayor, the city council, prosecutors, or defense 
attorneys — all because the program was privately funded.62  Keeping 
the program secret, especially from defense attorneys, is particularly 
problematic because the Baltimore police used this aerial surveillance 
information in criminal investigations.63 
Government reliance on funding loopholes to evade oversight is 
not uncommon.  In New Orleans, predictive policing technology was 
kept secret because the company provided it for free.64  In Seattle, 
police used alternative funding to install surveillance cameras after 
the city council refused to provide funding.65  Similarly, police in 
Bellingham, Washington, purchased a predictive policing system in 
the face of community and city council opposition, and while the 
 
 61. See infra note 317 and accompanying text (discussing use of procurement 
ordinances as a method to increase government transparency with regards to the 
purchase of surveillance technology). 
 62. Kevin Rector & Luke Broadwater, Report of Secret Aerial Surveillance by 
Baltimore Police Prompts Questions, Outrage, BALT. SUN (Aug. 24, 2016, 10:22 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-secret-
surveillance-20160824-story.html [https://perma.cc/9KKF-VHHY] (describing how 
the program was kept secret); Kevin Rector, Aerial Surveillance by Baltimore Police 
Has Promise, Should Be Studied More, Report Concludes, BALT. SUN (Feb. 10, 2017, 
10:11 PM), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-
surveillance-report-20170210-story.html [https://perma.cc/L8TM-NMMZ] (listing 
officials who did not know about the system). 
 63. See Rector, Aerial Surveillance by Baltimore Police Has Promise, supra note 
62. 
 64. Matt Sledge & Ramon Antonio Vargas, Controversial Policing Software 
Draws Criticism in New Orleans, GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 2, 2018), 
http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Controversial-Policing-Software-Draws-
Criticism-in-New-Orleans.html [https://perma.cc/52UG-Z7RW].  The policing 
program, which would have generally needed city council approval, was listed in the 
budget as a “philanthropic venture” allowing it to “[fly] under the radar” for years. 
Nicole Lindsey, Predictive Policing Raises Important Privacy and Human Rights 
Concerns, CPO MAG. (Mar. 16, 2018), 
https://www.cpomagazine.com/2018/03/16/predictive-policing-raises-important-
privacy-and-human-rights-concerns/ [https://perma.cc/BJ9Q-9UZT]. 
 65. Catherine Crump, Surveillance Policy Making by Procurement, 91 WASH. L. 
REV. 1595, 1606 (2016). 
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public was notified, the hearing where public comment was solicited 
was held after the decision to purchase the system was already 
finalized.66 
Police and prosecutors have also actively misled courts and defense 
counsel through “parallel construction” tactics to obscure the actual 
data relied on in their investigations.67  Authorities routinely cite 
contractual nondisclosure agreements (NDAs)68 and developer 
claims of trade secrets to avoid releasing all relevant information 
about predictive policing systems.69  All of these tactics threaten 
constitutional freedoms and increase state capacity to successfully 
target and control populations.  This is doubly problematic 
 
 66. DAVID ROBINSON & LOGAN KOEPKE, STUCK IN A PATTERN: EARLY EVIDENCE 
ON “PREDICTIVE POLICING” AND CIVIL RIGHTS 10 (2016), 
https://www.teamupturn.org/static/reports/2016/stuck-in-a-pattern/files/Upturn_-
_Stuck_In_a_Pattern_v.1.01.pdf [https://perma.cc/9VQU-42DR]. 
 67. See Claire Powers, Surveillance Remedies: Stingrays and the Exclusionary 
Rule, 96 OR. L. REV. 337, 351–55 (2017) (discussing use of parallel construction, 
nondisclosure agreements, euphemisms and other techniques to hide technologies 
such as cell site simulators); Elizabeth N. Jones, Possible Problems at the San 
Clemente Checkpoint, 6 VA. J. CRIM. L. 43, 83–86 (2018) (detailing investigations 
into parallel construction in drug enforcement cases, including reports suggesting that 
government officials are encouraged and trained to mislead courts and defense 
counsel); see also United States v. Patrick, 842 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2016) (Woods, 
J., dissenting) (finding the government purposefully concealed the Stingray’s use 
from a magistrate, the district court, defense counsel, and the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit).  Prosecutors have also dismissed charges against defendants 
rather than disclose particular surveillance technologies. See Alexandra Burlacu, FBI 
Drops Child Pornography Case to Avoid Disclosing Tor Vulnerability, TECH TIMES 
(Mar. 7, 2017, 10:42 AM), http://www.techtimes.com/articles/200592/20170307/fbi-
drops-child-pornography-case-to-avoid-disclosing-tor-vulnerability.htm 
[https://perma.cc/NS4M-MLY8]. 
 68. At least one court has held that police reliance on nondisclosure agreements 
to intentionally withhold information from a court when seeking a warrant “obstructs 
a court’s ability to make the necessary constitutional appraisal.”  State v. Andrews, 
134 A.3d 324, 338–39 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016).  In 2017, a New York trial court 
held that nondisclosure agreements, without more, could not insulate the New York 
City Police Department from a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request 
concerning information about predictive policing technologies. See Brennan Center 
for Justice v. N.Y.C. Police Dep’t, 2017 WL 6610414, at *10–12 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 
27, 2017). 
 69. See Joh, supra note 58, at 119.  Some states are attempting to increase 
transparency in algorithmic risk modeling systems.  The Pennsylvania Sentencing 
Commission sought public input and then rejected commercial products that refused 
to allow defendants to review the algorithm. Joshua Brustein, This Guy Trains 
Computers to Find Future Criminals, BLOOMBERG MEDIA (July 18, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-richard-berk-future-crime/ 
[https://perma.cc/K5F9-WJ2X]. 
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considering that algorithmic tools target the populations least able to 
challenge them.70 
Even in circumstances where government officials act with integrity 
and are transparent about their intentions to deploy predictive 
technology, significant issues remain.  The analytics used are flawed 
and the databases the algorithms run on are riddled with errors.71  
This is a devastating combination, which creates algorithmic decision-
making systems that reinforce historical patterns of discrimination 
and bias. 
B.  Problematic Analytics 
The predictive algorithm systems that governments rely on do not 
work as advertised and are far from infallible.  In addition, the 
systems conceal the political choices used to program the algorithms, 
and the opaque nature of the code obfuscates the feedback loops that 
reinforce their discriminatory application.  Much of the harm caused 
by big data analytics could be minimized if the agencies adopting 
them did minimal due diligence prior to purchase.  Given the over-
zealous marketing of big data analytics as a panacea to much of 
society’s ills, it is important to pause and consider just how fallible 
and dangerous these systems can be.72 
There is little research on whether predictive policing systems 
actually work.  Most of the studies on these systems are either 
authored or paid for by the very companies developing them,73 
 
 70. See, e.g., Alvaro M. Bedoya, The Color of Surveillance: What an Infamous 
Abuse of Power Teaches Us About the Modern Spy Era, SLATE (Jan. 18, 2016, 5:55 
AM), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2016/01/what_the_fbi_s_surveil
lance_of_martin_luther_king_says_about_modern_spying.html 
[https://perma.cc/2HXN-MELD] (noting that targets of state surveillance are 
historically people of color and immigrants). 
 71. See infra Sections I.B. and I.C. 
 72. This Article addresses how various states within the United States utilize 
algorithmic social control mechanisms.  However, other countries have implemented 
such technologies with similarly horrendous outcomes.  One glaring example is the 
Australian Centrelink debacle, which falsely accused thousands of defrauding the 
government. See Justin Warren, Australian Government Fails at IT Again, FORBES 
(Jan. 1, 2017, 10:05 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/justinwarren/2017/01/17/australian-government-fails-at-
it-again/#6e3e211f60d5 [https://perma.cc/5XQD-5VBZ]. 
 73. ROBINSON & KOEPKE, supra note 66, at 7–8 (2016) (“We are currently aware 
of two rigorous, scholarly studies of predictive policing in the United States whose 
authors have no interest in the success of the method being evaluated.  Both of these 
were conducted by the RAND Corporation.  Neither analysis found any safety 
benefit in the predictive policing tools studied.”). 
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leaving police departments with little reliable information to use 
when deciding whether to procure predictive algorithms.74  Early 
successes in crime control have not always been sustained, and while 
new jurisdictions continue to purchase predictive policing systems, 
others have discontinued or cancelled contracts.75 
Similarly, independent research on one of the common algorithms 
used to assess a defendant’s likelihood of reoffending found that the 
algorithm correctly predicted violent recidivism only twenty percent 
of the time.76  When all crimes, including misdemeanors, were taken 
into account, the algorithm was only “somewhat more accurate than a 
coin flip.”77  But the errors of this algorithm are far worse than being 
merely incorrect — the mistakes it made were racially biased.  The 
algorithm wrongly labeled black defendants as future re-offenders at 
almost twice the rate as white defendants, and white defendants were 
mislabeled as low risk more often than black defendants.78 
Criminal justice algorithms are not the only error ridden ones.  
Michigan’s implementation of its MiDAS unemployment algorithmic 
decision-making system79 was particularly destructive.  Designed as a 
fraud detection system, MiDAS reviewed not only current 
unemployment applications but also any benefits received within the 
past six years.80  The ninety-two percent error rate of the “robo-
adjudicated” reviews upended countless lives, flooded the state 
administrative appeals system with cases,81 and ultimately cost the 
 
 74. Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1109, 1159 (2017). 
 75. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 70 (noting that data on 
effectiveness of predictive policing remains inconclusive). 
 76. Julia Angwin et al., Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-
sentencing [https://perma.cc/Z4N2-JB23]. 
 77. Id. (“Of those deemed likely to re-offend, 61 percent were arrested for any 
subsequent crimes within two years.”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. See supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
 80. See Plaintiff’s First Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand at 
¶¶4-5, Cahoo et al. v. SAS Inst., No. 17-10657, 2017 WL 3405195 (E.D. Mich. July 7, 
2017). 
 81. Ryan Felton, Inside Michigan’s Faulty Unemployment System that Hit 
Thousands with Fraud, GUARDIAN (Feb. 12, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-
news/2016/feb/12/michigan-unemployment-insurance-benefit-automated-system-
fraud-penalties [https://perma.cc/5QD4-LCEW] (reporting that the system created a 
backlog of 23,000 unemployment appeals cases). 
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State of Michigan tens of millions of dollars in addition to the $47 
million dollars it has already paid to create the system.82 
There are similar concerns with the predictive analytics used in 
child welfare.  One of the developers who designed a child 
maltreatment risk assessment tool for Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, designed a similar system to be used in New Zealand.83  
The risk assessment system was implemented in Allegheny County,84 
but implementation in New Zealand was halted in part because 
subsequent research showed it had a nearly seventy percent error rate 
when identifying children at highest risk.85  The Los Angeles County 
Office of Child Protection halted the adoption of another child 
welfare algorithm when auditing indicated a ninety-five percent false-
positive rate.86  Illinois recently terminated its contract with a 
company providing a child abuse prediction system because, in the 
words of the director, “it didn’t seem to be predicting much.”87 
Lack of governmental understanding of the algorithmic tools they 
purchase involves issues beyond purchasing error-prone systems.  The 
development of decision-making algorithms, from inception through 
complex and layered computer coding, is a multistep affair requiring 
 
 82. See Paul Egan, Michigan Agency Review Finds 70% Error Rate in Jobless 
Fraud Findings, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Aug. 11, 2017, 8:39 PM), 
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2017/08/11/michigan-agency-
review-finds-70-error-rate-fraud-findings/559880001/ [https://perma.cc/AP4B-LZG5] 
(discussing how the agency gives various error rates depending on whether the review 
was completely automated (robo-adjudication) or included human review of the files 
flagged by the algorithm). 
 83. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 136–38. 
 84. Id. at 137. 
 85. Id. at 138. 
 86. See JUDGE MICHAEL NASH, EXAMINATION OF USING STRUCTURED DECISION 
MAKING® AND PREDICTIVE ANALYTICS IN ASSESSING SAFETY AND RISK IN CHILD 
WELFARE (May 4, 2017), 
http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/bos/bc/1023048_05.04.17OCPReportonRiskAssessm
entTools_SDMandPredictiveAnalytics_.pdf [https://perma.cc/BL3K-7U7V].  The 
Director of the Los Angeles County Office of Child Protection indicated that the 
system had a 95.6% false-positive rate. Daniel Heimpel, Uncharted Waters: Data 
Analytics and Child Protection in Los Angeles, CHRON. SOC. CHANGE (July 20, 
2015), https://chronicleofsocialchange.org/featured/uncharted-waters-data-analytics-
and-child-protection-in-los-angeles/10867 [https://perma.cc/YL3K-YS2L]. 
 87. David Jackson & Gary Marx, Data Mining Program Designed to Predict 
Child Abuse Proves Unreliable, DCFS Says, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 6, 2017), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/ct-dcfs-eckerd-met-20171206-
story.html [https://perma.cc/RZ59-SNN6] (quoting Illinois Department of Children 
and Family Services Director Beverly “B.J.” Walker).  Even with these predictive 
failures, at least seven other states continue to use similar systems from this vendor. 
Id. 
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choices that create many opportunities for human error and bias.88  
For example, when building an algorithmic system, a choice has to be 
made as to how different errors, false positives and false negatives, 
are weighed.  This means that in developing a predictive policing 
system, a decision will have to be made as to which is worse: to have 
an innocent person treated as a potential criminal (a false positive) or 
to have the algorithm overlook potential criminal activity (a false 
negative).89 
False positives upend people’s lives in a manner that cannot be 
disregarded or minimized.  For those involved with the child welfare 
system, for instance, false positives are not mere inconveniences.  A 
child welfare investigation can have profound and long-lasting 
consequences on children and families,90 including increased risk of 
juvenile delinquency,91 parental loss of employment,92 and 
deportation.93  Simultaneously, a false negative means that potential 
 
 88. See Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 665–66 (describing the multiple steps in 
algorithmic development and potential challenges); see also Rich, supra note 8, at 
885–86 (describing points of human decision making in development of algorithms 
that can cause inaccuracies and errors).  It is likely that systems developed by humans 
are inherently biased. See NOBLE, supra note 7, at 2 (suggesting that the racist and 
sexist attitudes of those developing search algorithms undermine the idea that they 
are capable of developing neutral or objective decision-making tools). 
 89. Rich, supra note 8, at 885. 
 90. See Paul Chill, Burden of Proof Begone: The Pernicious Effect of Emergency 
Removal in Child Protective Proceedings, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 457, 459 (2003) 
(describing the harm to families and children from child removals and also noting the 
danger children face in the foster care system); Doriane Lambelet Coleman, 
Storming the Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare 
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 417–19 (2005) 
(describing the damage child welfare investigations inflict on children). 
 91. Alicia LeVezu, Alone and Ignored: Children Without Advocacy in Child 
Abuse and Neglect Courts, 14 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 125, 126 (2018) 
(describing studies which found that children in the foster care system have higher 
rates of juvenile delinquency and involvement with the criminal justice system). 
 92. See Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1178 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(noting that the consequences of parents being listed in California’s Central Index 
include the inability to secure licenses for a variety of jobs); Amy Sindin, “Why 
Won’t Mom Cooperate?”: A Critique of Informality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 
11 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 339, 362–63 (1999) (describing the mental health 
consequences created by family separation on children and parents); see also 
EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 161 (describing the impact that a child welfare 
investigation has on families). 
 93. See Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the 
Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 102 (2011) (explaining that the 
intersection of child welfare and immigration systems increases the likelihood of 
family separation and deportation); David B. Thronson, Creating Crisis: Immigration 
Raids and the Destabilization of Immigrant Families, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 391, 
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child maltreatment is missed.  Because there is an “unavoidable 
nexus” between the two types of errors, an algorithmic shift towards 
one automatically creates an opposing shift away from the other.94 
Computer programmers must “tune” an algorithm to favor one 
type of error over the other, or, if possible, must attempt to weigh 
each of these algorithmic mistakes equally.  Each such “tuning” is not 
only a technological decision, but a political one, the outcome of 
which privileges different stakeholders.95  Unfortunately, these 
political decisions are often made without the input of anyone other 
than a private company or individual programmer.96  Worse yet, these 
choices, created through the process of selecting and assigning 
weights to variables,97 can be shifted to actively penalize already 
targeted populations.  One striking example of this is how older 
benefits automation systems were coded so that the computers would 
interpret all errors against the recipient rather than the agency.98 
Developing algorithmic decision-making systems to prioritize false 
positives, especially in systems that involve state coercion and control, 
is politically driven and often connected to economic concerns.  A 
probation algorithm implemented in Philadelphia was initially 
intentionally coded to overpredict the likelihood that an inmate 
would commit a violent crime if paroled.99  When the city realized the 
cost of serving the large number of inmates flagged by a system tuned 
to prioritize false positives, it had the developer alter the weighting of 
 
408–09 (2008) (discussing how states are using immigration status to decline family 
reunification services). 
 94. Robert J. Lukens, The Impact of Mandatory Reporting Requirements on the 
Child Welfare System, 5 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 213 (2007). 
 95. Robert Brauneis & Ellen P. Goodman, Algorithmic Transparency for the 
Smart City, 20 YALE J.L. & TECH. 103, 120 (2018). 
 96. See supra note 3 and accompanying text (describing how individual code 
writers alter governmental policy) and supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text 
(describing governmental ceding of authority to third-party system developers). 
 97. See Virginia Eubanks, A Response to Allegheny County DHS, VIRGINIA 
EUBANK BLOG (Feb. 16, 2018), https://virginia-eubanks.com/2018/02/16/a-response-
to-allegheny-county-dhs/ [https://perma.cc/6MRJ-RXK4] (noting that to understand a 
predictive analytic system, one needs to know the variables and the weight the system 
assigns to each variable). 
 98. Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1309, 1357–58 
(2012).  An agency mindset that assumes fraud on the part of those it is supposed to 
assist is also evident in Michigan’s MiDAS system.  There, a court determined that 
the system’s questionnaire automatically targeted applicants rather than being a 
neutral request for an explanation about any discrepancies, which was “decidedly 
accusatory” and violated a claimant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.  Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 809 (E.D. Mich. 2016). 
 99. Brustein, supra note 69. 
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the system variables to reduce the number of inmates scored as “high 
risk” for violent recidivism.100 
Politics, or at least the sociocultural reflections of politics, influence 
big data analytics in other ways.  Since society is reflected in the 
information contained in data sets utilized by algorithms in making 
predictions, even well-designed systems will replicate and amplify the 
preexisting biases and discrimination inherent in society.101  Current 
legal doctrine is often of limited value in remedying these types of 
harms, because the bias or discrimination created by algorithmic 
decision-making, even if it tracks constitutionally prohibited 
prejudice, is masked by outwardly neutral proxy variables coded into 
the systems.102  This creates a sort of algorithmic “rational” racism,103 
which can be as destructive as overt prejudice but is easier to miss and 
harder to challenge.104 
That predictive algorithms mask preexisting patterns of 
discrimination is perhaps most visible in policing.  Given law 
enforcement’s long history of racial discrimination, proxies for race 
become “baked”105 into predictive policing systems.  For example, if 
police primarily arrest people of color from minority neighborhoods 
for marijuana-related offenses, even though people of all races and all 
neighborhoods use marijuana at equal rates, the algorithm will 
 
 100. Id. 
 101. Predictive analytics rely on an iterative process: actions are taken based on 
algorithmic information; these actions are then translated into further data that is fed 
back into the system.  When run on biased data this creates a feedback loop that 
perpetuates bias. See KADIJA FERRYMAN & MIKAELA PITCAN, DATA & SOC’Y, 
FAIRNESS IN PRECISION MEDICINE 11 (2018), https://datasociety.net/output/fairness-
in-precision-medicine/ [https://perma.cc/YTR7-B38T]. 
 102. A proxy variable is a characteristic that correlates with another attribute that 
the algorithm’s developer wants to include.  For example, variables such as 
neighborhoods or zip codes are outwardly neutral proxies that allow an algorithm to 
take race into account without referencing race directly. See Barocas & Selbst, supra 
note 8, at 712. 
 103. EUBANKS supra note 7, at 190. See also Philip Hacker & Bilyana Petkova, 
Reining in the Big Promise of Big Data: Transparency, Inequality, and New 
Regulatory Frontiers, 15 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 7–9 (2017) (noting that big 
data analytics can uncover correlations that are seemingly neutral but track 
discriminatory traits). 
 104. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 712–13 (arguing that the intent 
necessary under Title VII and similar civil rights laws can be masked through 
manipulation of variables, which serve as proxies obscuring even intentional 
discrimination). 
 105. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 122.  Anywhere race and 
poverty correlate, systems using variables that measure poverty as any part of their 
predictive algorithm, such as foreclosures or concentration of multifamily dwellings, 
will end up replicating systemic racism. Id. 
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correlate both race and minority neighborhoods with marijuana 
use.106  When police departments develop strategies based on the 
results of such an algorithm, the strategies will correlate race with 
drugs even if race was completely removed from the model, because 
of the location correlation.107 
But bias is not limited to predictive policing systems.  When 
Allegheny County was developing its Family Screening Tool (AFST), 
it selected two outcome variables to be used as stand-ins for child 
maltreatment.108  The first variable was community re-referral, where 
a call to the child maltreatment hotline was initially screened out, but 
the county received another call to the hotline on the same child 
within two years;109 the second was child placement, where a call to 
the hotline was initially screened in, and resulted in the child being 
placed in foster care within two years.110  The county admitted that 
these two variables were not optimal, but argued that the “model has 
to test what’s available.”111  One of the outcome variables, 
community re-referral, is based entirely on the most racially biased 
part of Allegheny County’s child welfare system.112  Thus the county 
used the activity known to introduce the most racial bias into its child 
 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Outcome variables are used to measure the phenomenon a system is trying to 
predict.  In the Allegheny County screening tool, the outcome variables are “how” 
child maltreatment was defined in the algorithm.  Predictive variables are factors the 
algorithm determines correlate with finding the outcome variables (child 
maltreatment).  When building the AFST, the developers initially began with close to 
300 predictive variables, but ultimately ended up with 131 predictive variables they 
found highly correlated with either re-referral or child placement. EUBANKS, supra 
note 6, at 144. 
 109. Id. at 143. 
 110. Id. at 144. 
 111. Id.  The number of significant individual instances of child maltreatment in 
the county was not large enough to be able to develop a statistically significant 
model, so the developers had to select other events or actions to include as outcome 
variables. Id. 
 112. Community members call the hotline three and a half times more often on 
black and biracial families than they do on white families. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 
153.  In its own study, Allegheny County determined that the greatest racial 
disproportionality in its child welfare system takes place at the point when a 
community member calls to refer a child via the abuse and neglect hotline, not when 
a screener determines whether or not to screen the child into the system. Id.; see also 
Press Release, Marc Cherna, Dir., Dep’t of Human Servs., DHS Response to 
Automated Inequality by Virginia Eubanks (Jan. 31, 2018), 
https://www.alleghenycounty.us/WorkArea/linkit.aspx?LinkIdentifier=id&ItemID=6
442461672 [https://perma.cc/S3CQ-SCTA] (acknowledging racial bias in call 
referrals). 
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welfare system as one of two events the model defined as child 
maltreatment.113 
The AFST system also oversampled poverty as an indicator that a 
child was at high risk of harm.  This is because the majority of the 
predictive variables114 the algorithm analyzed tracked income-based 
programs such as food stamps, TANF grants,115 county medical 
assistance and supplemental security income (SSI), or other indicators 
of poverty such as homelessness, lack of food, or any family 
involvement with the juvenile justice or probation systems.116  Thus 
by its selection of which outcome and predictive variables the system 
would measure, Allegheny County created an algorithm that directly 
links poverty and race to the likelihood of child maltreatment.117 
Once a family is scored as “at high risk” by the AFST, they come 
under increased scrutiny and surveillance, creating a potential cycle of 
bias.  The information is permanently stored in the Allegheny County 
database.118  Behavior that might have once been seen as 
inconsequential will forever be viewed through a lens that marks the 
family as potential abusers.119  If Allegheny County implements a 
 
 113. This was done even though there were other variables that could have 
reduced algorithmic bias — the system could have used likelihood of being screened 
into the system or only used the likelihood of removal, both of which are based on 
the professional judgments of caseworkers and family court judges. EUBANKS, supra 
note 6, at 155. 
 114. Id. at 143–44 (explaining the difference between predictive and outcome 
variables).  Once the AFST system is implemented, the algorithm searches the 
information in the county database on those living with the child for any of the 
predictive variables and, using a system that weights each variable, assigns the family 
a score suggesting how more or less likely it is the child will be maltreated. Id. 
 115. Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) is the federal program 
that provides monies to states via block grants for aiding poor families. Andrew 
Hammond, Welfare and Federalism’s Peril, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2017). 
 116. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 156. 
 117. Id. at 144. 
 118. Id. at 150. 
 119. In the past, a family that successfully extracted itself from the child welfare 
system or a person found not guilty of a crime could fade into “practical obscurity,” 
because the government did not have the capacity to capture and analyze the data 
necessary to reveal past entanglements with government entities. See Fred Cate, 
Government Data Mining: The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 435, 435 (2008) (noting that technology erodes the individual privacy once 
provided by “practical obscurity”).  Eubanks’ exploration of the AFST demonstrates 
the persistent and discriminatory nature of algorithmic scoring.  The reader is 
introduced to a family with a child that was subject to a series of child welfare 
investigations, all unfounded — meaning there was no indication of child 
maltreatment — based on referral calls possibly made by an angry neighbor.  Even 
though all of those calls were unfounded, that call information goes into and remains 
in the county data pool.  Because the algorithm uses chance of re-referral as one of its 
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predictive policing algorithm, this information could be forever 
factored into that system as well.120   A similar phenomenon occurs 
when predictive policing systems target those who live in high crime 
areas or have had repeated contacts with police, because those 
variables correlate with crime.121  This feedback loop, which has been 
tellingly described as “selection bias meets confirmation bias,”122 
consistently directs police back into the same neighborhoods, thereby 
continuing to populate databases with data reinforcing the systems’ 
initial biased predictions. 
Challenging algorithmic decision-making is made even more 
difficult because the technology consists of multiple layers of complex 
subsystems.  For example, during the litigation challenging 
Arkansas’s implementation of its Medicaid algorithm,123 it became 
clear that there were at least two major subsystem errors causing 
mistaken reductions in benefits.  One was within the algorithm itself 
and the other was in the software of another company responsible for 
creating the platform that allowed the algorithm to interface with the 
state’s database.124  While this particular error was somewhat 
 
proxy variables, this child is forever connected to a series of referral calls.  Allegheny 
County is apparently considering applying its system to every child born in the 
county. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 171–72.  If this child grows up and gives birth in 
Allegheny County that data will follow her, increasing the likelihood that the 
algorithm will flag her own newborn child as at risk for maltreatment, regardless of 
her parenting capacity. See id. 
 120. See id. at 135 (describing the different county entities whose records are 
stored in a central repository in which the child welfare algorithm is run.  These 
include adult and juvenile probation records, county jail records, and Allegheny 
County police records.); see also THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 
14–18 (describing the interlinked and permanent digital record of information on 
individuals based on information collected by local, state, and federal governments 
which are often searchable by a myriad of government entities); EUBANKS, supra 
note 6, at 93–94 (personal information about those seeking homeless services in Los 
Angeles shared with the Los Angeles Police Department). 
 121. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 46–48. 
 122. Kristian Lum & William Isaac, To Predict and Serve?, 13 SIGNIFICANCE 14, 16 
(2016), https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1740-9713.2016.00960.x [https://perma.cc/8HYA-
4Q8H]. 
 123. See Lecher, supra note 40 (describing Arkansas’s adoption of algorithmic 
assessment system for Medicaid patients). 
 124. Id.; Transcript of Trial at 38, 40, Jacobs ex rel. v. Gillespie, 3:16-cv-00119 
(E.D. Ark. Oct. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Jacobs Trial Transcript] (on file with author).  
Similarly, in a recently filed class action in the Michigan Unemployment Insurance 
debacle, the complaint alleged that three different groups of private corporate actors 
designed, created, implemented, or maintained the error-ridden automated MiDAS 
system deployed by the state. Cahoo v. SAS Inst. Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 772, 787 (E.D. 
Mich. 2018). 
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complex,125 even simple calculation errors can create a cascade of 
algorithmic mistakes.126  Additionally, coding errors remain hidden 
unless there is a concerted challenge to the system or repeated annual 
testing.127 
C.  Inaccurate and Discriminatory Data 
Big data analytics includes not just the computer algorithms 
themselves, as straightforward or complex as they may be.  Big data 
analytics includes “big data.”  Even carefully constructed and 
transparent algorithms are only as good as the data they process.  It is 
through the data that algorithms detect patterns and make 
predictions, and it is the data that determines how well algorithms 
actually function.128  Data sets, especially the massive data sets 
needed to train predictive analytic systems, are another important 
reason why the predictive analytics used by governments to target 
and control vulnerable populations are dangerously flawed. 
The immense data sets that big data analytics require are often 
inaccurate and incomplete and are generally impervious to attempts 
at correction.  While governments have always surveilled people 
within their borders, one key aspect of modern data collection is the 
extent to which data is aggregated to create vast, searchable, ever-
growing data sets.  This “big data” comes in large part from private 
data brokers129 that collect, aggregate, and sell information gleaned 
from an almost unimaginable range of sources.130  Government 
 
 125. See Jacobs Trial Transcript, supra note 124, at 36–37 (documenting the 
difficulty the State’s attorney and the judge had with understanding where the errors 
occurred and how each might affect the case). 
 126. See Eric Westervelt, Did a Bail Reform Algorithm Contribute to this San 
Francisco Man’s Murder?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 18, 2018, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/08/18/543976003/did-a-bail-reform-algorithm-contribute-to-
this-san-francisco-man-s-murder [https://perma.cc/G29J-LDY7] (reporting that 
mistakes in calculating the number of days an inmate had spent in jail led to an 
incorrect risk assessment score for the court to review when making pre-trial release 
determination). 
 127. See K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 714 (D. Idaho 2016) (noting that 
inaccuracy of algorithmic “budget tool” for Medicaid recipients “puts a premium on 
testing the tool for accuracy”). 
 128. Lehr & Ohm, supra note 3, at 677. 
 129. Data brokers supply data or inferences about people gathered mainly from 
sources other than the data subjects themselves. RIEKE ET AL., supra note 53, at 11. 
 130. See id. at 9–11 (observing that data is gathered from public sources such as 
state licensing information, school data, social media, etc., as well as from private 
sources such as information provided by healthcare systems, financial institutions, 
employers, and retailers); THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 12–15 
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agencies also compile their own massive data sets, built on arrest 
records, convictions, alleged gang affiliations, probation and parole 
records, child welfare reports, licensing applications, education 
records and other sources.131  Technological advances allow these 
data sets to be searched across formats without requiring the data to 
be centrally located or merged.132 
As governments routinely purchase data from data brokers, the 
separation between public and private data is continuously eroded.133  
This “collect it all” mindset,134 which endorses the gathering and 
retention of as much data as possible, serves two functions.  First, it 
reifies data analytics as a tool of state control.135  Second, it creates 
the massive data sets necessary for predictive analytics.136  
Additionally, governments’ propensity to collect, store, and search 
ever-increasing amounts of information fosters a public-private 
symbiotic relationship which reinforces the market for algorithmic 
social control systems. 
The problem is that all large data sets are “dirty,” filled with errors 
and mistakes.137  Neither private companies138 nor governments 
spend the time and money necessary to ensure their accuracy.139  In 
 
(describing the myriad ways in which individuals are tracked and surveilled, and the 
data sold to data brokers). 
 131. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 17–19. 
 132. Max N. Helveston, Consumer Protection in the Age of Big Data, 93 WASH. U. 
L. REV. 859, 867 (2016). 
 133. Governments can purchase directly from data brokers, or indirectly when they 
use systems provided by private companies that themselves rely on data provided by 
data brokers. 
 134. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 107. 
 135. Wayne A. Logan & Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Criminal Justice 
Data, 101 MINN. L. REV. 541, 549 (2016). 
 136. See THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 13 (observing that the 
combination of big data and new analytic tools supports development of predictive 
policing algorithms). 
 137. See, e.g., Madden et al., supra note 29, at 87 (noting the “troublingly high” 
error rate in consumer credit reports); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and 
Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 398–99 (2015) (describing 
the errors in police gang databases, arrest reports, and FBI files); Richard Warner & 
Robert H. Sloan, The Ethics of the Algorithm: Autonomous Systems and the 
Wrapper of Human Control, 48 CUMB. L. REV. 37, 44–45 (2018) (stating predictive 
analytics require data to be simplified and decontextualized, removing ambiguity and 
narrative essential to explaining human behavior). 
 138. See Madden et al., supra note 29, at 88 (describing the difficulty consumers 
face when attempting to correct errors in credit reports). 
 139. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 8, at 689 (2016) (noting that decision-makers 
justify using easily accessible but inaccurate data because of the higher cost of 
creating accurate data sets). 
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addition, data brokers do not merely sell factual data, incorrect or 
not.  They also sell model data — inferences about individuals based 
on algorithmic predictions.140  This creates an additional layer of less 
than accurate information government algorithms analyze.  Thus, 
error rates in government systems are often exacerbated when 
governments combine data from data brokers with already 
problematic government data.141  Large data sets are also vulnerable 
to generating their own errors in the form of false or spurious 
statistical relationships.  This is because the risk of an algorithm 
surfacing a statistically significant but contextually meaningless 
connection between variables increases as the size of data sets 
increases.142 
Data error leads to faulty predictions and potentially dangerous 
wrong decisions.143  In 2009, Justice Ginsburg warned that 
“[i]naccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic 
information raise grave concerns for individual liberty.”144  That 
 
 140. RIEKE ET AL., supra note 53, at 11. 
 141. Andrew D. Selbst, Disparate Impact in Big Data Policing, 52 GA. L. REV. 109, 
136 (2017) (describing how data brokers assemble and organize their data on the 
assumption that it will be used for advertising, a very risk-tolerant activity, which 
means that brokers have no incentive to correct errors). 
 142. Rick Swedloff, Risk Classification’s Big Data (R)evolution, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 
339, 355 (2015); see also Nicholas Taleb, Beware the Dangers of Big Data, WIRED 
MAG. (Feb. 8, 2013), https://www.wired.com/2013/02/big-data-means-big-errors-
people/ [https://perma.cc/LY3Q-HEMT] (“[I]n large data sets the large deviations 
the algorithms surface are vastly more attributable to variance (or noise) than to 
information (or signal)”).  One example of this was the claim that algorithmic mining 
of Google search results predicted the spread of the flu more accurately and quickly 
than the Center for Disease Control and Prevention.  This heralded prediction 
capacity faltered and ultimately failed in part because the size of the data set surfaced 
spurious correlations. See Gary Marcus & Ernest Davis, Eight (No, Nine!) Problems 
with Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/opinion/eight-no-nine-problems-with-big-
data.html [https://perma.cc/CXE8-WT36]. 
 143. For example, Intrado’s “Beware” system promises to provide “real time 
threat scores” to police.  Threat scores have real time consequences because they 
affect and alter police response to a particular address.  See THE RISE OF BIG DATA 
POLICING, supra note 6, at 187. 
 144. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  
The impact of database reliability issues continues to percolate through the courts. 
See, e.g., United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 786 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 2015) (“This 
court and others have regularly upheld traffic stops based on information that the 
defendant’s vehicle’s registration failed to appear in a law enforcement database — at 
least when the record suggested no reason to worry about the database’s reliability.” 
(emphasis added)).  Here, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found that 
there was evidence “suggesting that the database on which the officer relied to justify 
his stop might bear a real problem — a problem that might mean a ‘no return’ 
doesn’t suggest criminal conduct but only some bureaucratic snafu.” Id. 
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warning was not heeded, and as more governmental decisions become 
automated, the situation has only worsened.  Unfortunately, as we 
have become a nation reliant on technology, “data error” has become 
a mundane excuse that conceals real harm. 
That data error has the potential to disrupt individual liberty is 
made clear in police creation of gang databases.  Law enforcement 
conceptualizes gangs as a problem of racialized young men, as 
evidenced by the fact that most people in gang databases are men of 
color, most of whom do not have criminal records.145  Being 
incorrectly labeled a “gang member” has negative consequences not 
only for the person so labeled, but also for those associated with such 
person.146  Since predictive policing technologies operate within these 
racialized databases, the algorithms used in these systems cannot 
avoid being racially discriminatory.147 
Data errors not only infect data sets created by commercial data 
brokers or law enforcement — large government agencies, such as 
state health and human services departments or education systems, 
create, collect, and (often poorly) manage large amounts of data 
pertaining to various populations.  State agency data error is 
comically widespread with potentially tragic results.148  In Indiana’s 
rush to privatize and automate its public benefits system, for example, 
the state moved to a centralized document processing center.149  So 
much of the data either went missing or was incorrectly entered in 
digital case files that the processing center became known as the 
“black hole in Marion.”150 
 
 145. RUTHANN ROBSON, DRESSING CONSTITUTIONALLY: HIERARCHY, SEXUALITY, 
AND DEMOCRACY FROM OUR HAIRSTYLES TO OUR SHOES 124 (2013).  In California, 
a state auditor found systemic failures in gang databases including the listing of forty-
two infants as gang members. See also THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 
6, at 52. 
 146. Predictive policing uses social networking to link individuals to friends, family, 
and associates, and uses this information to target those connected to the initial 
target. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Policing Predictive Policing, 94 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 1109, 1137–38, 1140 (2017). 
 147. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 53. 
 148. See, e.g., Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2016) 
(deciding that allegations of high error rate in an unemployment fraud detection 
system supported standing for legal services office); State of New Mexico ex rel. 
Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe County 
Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) (noting large numbers of errors in data used in teacher assessment 
system, suggesting the system could not be trusted); K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 
3d 703, 711–12 (D. Idaho 2016) (describing the massive errors in Idaho’s Medicaid 
data base). 
 149. See EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 50. 
 150. Id. 
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Automating the processing of public benefits not only increases the 
chance for data error through centralization, but also by drastically 
reducing the number of caseworkers assisting clients navigating public 
benefits systems.151  By reducing the ability to talk to a human 
caseworker who can resolve errors and mistakes, these systems create 
an inflexible process where data error, no matter how inconsequential 
or inadvertent, no matter whose fault, is deemed a “failure to 
cooperate,”152 which is the bureaucratic conclusion that terminates 
someone’s healthcare, food stamps, or housing allotment.  The 
landscape of state attempts to automate their benefit systems is 
littered with thousands of people in dire circumstances who, because 
of data error, lost their benefits.153  The designation of “failure to 
cooperate,” especially when it emanates from an automated system 
that minimizes the ability to engage with another human being to 
solve the problem, is dehumanizing, frightening, and destabilizing.154 
Data errors contained in the large data sets used by governments 
are almost impossible to challenge or correct,155 not to mention that 
the existence of the databases themselves is often kept secret.156  
Because predictive analytics require as much data as possible in order 
to function, private companies and public agencies are inclined to use 
data even when they know it is wrong.  For example, the officials 
using analytics to predict child maltreatment in Allegheny County 
argued that allowing parents to expunge hotline reports on their 
 
 151. Id. at 62–63; see also Perdue v. Murphy, 915 N.E.2d 498, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 
2009) (noting that because of the loss of caseworkers, “[w]hile it is mathematically 
possible, it is unlikely that a client calling about his or her case would speak to the 
same employee each time”). 
 152. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 53; see also supra note 98 and accompanying text 
(noting how systems are tuned so that all errors run against the recipient). 
 153. See, e.g., supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text; see also EUBANKS, supra 
note 6, at 53 (describing in detail the impact of data error in attempted automation of 
Indiana’s public benefit system). 
 154. See EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 53, 70 (providing narratives from some of those 
harmed by Indiana’s implementation of its privatized benefits system). 
 155. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 62 (discussing the fact that 
there are no processes for correcting errors in many police documents such as rap 
sheets and arrest records); Rebecca A. Hufstader, Immigration Reliance on Gang 
Databases: Unchecked Discretion and Undesirable Consequences, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
671, 680 (2015) (noting how difficult it is to challenge being incorrectly listed in a 
gang database, and that most people are unaware they may be included in a gang 
database because the databases are considered confidential). 
 156. Many law enforcement or security databases remain secret. See Margaret Hu, 
Big Data Blacklisting, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1735, 1745–46 (2015) (law enforcement 
databases classified or confidential); see also Hufstader, supra note 155, at 684 (gang 
data bases as confidential). 
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children, no matter how spurious, would rob the agency of critical 
data.157  However, without expungement, this misleading and 
erroneous data will continue to be used by the algorithm to score 
children and families in the future. 
In addition to data error, there is the issue of who is included and 
who is missing from data sets.  Wealth and social privilege provide 
protections from aggressive police surveillance, creating a data gap 
that can shield the privileged from predictive policing systems.158  In 
contrast, poverty and race attract over-policing and hyper-
surveillance, which disproportionately populates police databases 
with information on poor communities and people of color.159  Given 
that predictive algorithms learn from the data sets they analyze, 
predictive policing algorithms based on skewed crime data replicate 
and exacerbate preexisting biases already inherent in the system. 
Similar problems exist in algorithms built to predict child 
maltreatment.  These algorithms analyze data regarding a person’s 
history of public assistance, drug use and mental health issues, as well 
as their past experiences with the child welfare or the juvenile justice 
systems, to determine risk scores.160  This is information based almost 
entirely on whether someone uses public services or has contact with 
the criminal justice system.  Missing almost completely, however, is 
data on people able to access private drug or alcohol treatment, 
mental health services, financial support, or who were able, based on 
social privilege, to minimize contact with the criminal justice 
 
 157. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 164. See also Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 
554 F.3d 1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (noting that California refused to expunge parents 
from a child abuse database even when the parents were found “factually innocent”). 
 158. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 180 (describing how private 
property, economic mobility, and social status create significantly different data 
patterns for rich and poor persons, and how, in a data driven policing system, that 
difference would give the wealthy a “presumption of data driven innocence”). 
 159. Id. at 75 (describing discrepancies in police stops and searches of people of 
color, primarily black men in Ferguson, Missouri, and discussing police targeting Skid 
Row with facial recognition technology and focused data collection via aerial 
surveillance over West Baltimore — a predominately African-American community). 
 160. See supra notes 114–16 and accompanying text.  While this Article is focused 
on the issues surrounding the use of algorithmic mechanisms to control marginalized 
populations in the United States, similar systems, often built by the same private 
companies, are being implemented globally. In the United Kingdom, a similar system 
monitoring families reviews data on debt, worklessness, benefits, housing, domestic 
violence, and anti-social behavior, among other factors, to create a “family profile.”  
Luke Stevenson, Artificial Intelligence: How a Council Seeks to Predict Support 
Needs for Children and Families, COMMUNITY CARE (Mar. 1, 2018), 
http://www.communitycare.co.uk/2018/03/01/artificial-intelligence-council-seeks-
predict-support-needs-children-families/ [https://perma.cc/YR7V-Z9GL]. 
2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 393 
system.161  Thus, those who can access private programs and support 
services will disproportionately receive lower risk scores, regardless of 
their individual likelihood to harm their children, than those using 
similar services provided by the county. 
With algorithmic decision-making, what counts is the content of the 
data set, even if that content is unreliable, biased, or just plain wrong.  
Because problematic algorithms rely on flawed and biased data sets, 
governmental decision-making is bound to repeat and reinforce the 
already existing discrimination and bias created by past conduct used 
to control marginalized populations.  To successfully challenge 
government adoption of these technologies, it is important to 
understand the psychology, history, and politics driving their use. 
II.  FORCES DRIVING GOVERNMENT ADOPTION OF BIG DATA 
ANALYTICS 
Algorithmic decision-making systems are often promoted with 
claims of efficiency, cost savings, and reduction of human bias.162  But 
they are also sold to the public using language that politicizes poverty 
and crime.  For example, Indiana’s governor characterized the state’s 
welfare system as “wasteful, fraudulent,” and “broken beyond the 
ability of state employees to fix it” in order to sell the public on a 
costly new automated system designed and managed by a private 
corporation.163  Predictive policing systems are described as race-
neutral and “objective” tools, even though they allow the 
continuation of aggressive policing practices.164 
The language used to champion these technologies mirrors the 
forces driving governments to employ them: a deference to science 
and technology, the historical success of technological social control 
mechanisms, and the neoliberal embrace of privatization.  To 
successfully challenge predictive algorithms and the social control 
mechanisms they perpetuate, advocates must not only understand the 
technology, they must understand the forces driving its adoption. 
 
 161. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 147.  When asked whether the county was going to 
seek information from private providers, administrators said they wanted private 
data but receiving it was likely impossible.  Id. at 157. 
 162. Id. at 9; THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 6. 
 163. These political claims were highly contested. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 46.  In 
addition, Indiana signed a billion-dollar contract with a private company to develop 
the system after only one public hearing. Id. at 48. 
 164. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 6. 
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A.  Deference to Science and Technology 
Governments at all levels are flocking to predictive technologies 
that “bear the glossy veneer of science,”165 driven in large part by 
perceptions that the technology is infallible.166  This is one 
instantiation of automation bias — the human tendency to disregard 
contradictory information in light of computer-generated solutions.167  
This bias can lead those using decision-making technologies to rely on 
automated decisions even when they suspect a system has 
malfunctioned.168  Uncritical deference to technology is aggravated 
by the inability of those outside the technical community to 
understand algorithms or the science behind predictive analytics.169  
This technological ignorance adds to the mystique of algorithmic 
infallibility, giving many a distorted, subservient, almost “theological 
view” of computational accuracy.170 
Automation bias subconsciously alters behavior.  The developers 
of the Allegheny County child welfare algorithm claimed that the 
predictive system was designed so that risk scores it generates would 
be questioned by intake screeners.171  In actuality, screeners started to 
defer to the system — in some instances, screeners asked managers 
for permission to go back and change their initial risk assessment 
scores if the algorithm produced a different score.172  Similarly, some 
police officers have shifted their patrol patterns in response to over-
reliance on various predictive policing tools.  For example, officers in 
 
 165. Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, 103 MINN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 1) (on file with authors). 
 166. Deven R. Desai & Joshua A. Kroll, Trust but Verify: A Guide to Algorithms 
and the Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2017). 
 167. Kenneth A. Bamberger, Technologies of Compliance: Risk and Regulation in 
a Digital Age, 88 TEX. L. REV. 669, 711–12 (2010). 
 168. See Citron, supra note 1, at 1271 (noting that literature in the field of cognitive 
systems engineering finds that humans view automated systems as error-resistant and 
rely on computer output even when they suspect a system malfunction). 
 169. Bamberger, supra note 167, at 712; see also Harry Surden, Values Embedded 
in Legal Artificial Intelligence (U. Colo. L. Legal Stud., Research Paper No. 17-17, 
Oct. 18, 2017), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2932333 [http://perma.cc/3RUC-54PP] 
(arguing that algorithmic recommendations in sentencing creates an illusion of how 
mathematical “objectivity” can mask underlying subjective human judgments of 
system designers). 
 170. Ian Bogost, The Cathedral of Computation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 15, 2015), 
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2015/01/the-cathedral-of-
computation/384300 [https://perma.cc/P4AA-UNJ7]. 
 171. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 141 (noting that the developer insisted the model 
was built in such a way that the screeners would question its predictive accuracy and 
trust their own judgment). 
 172. Id. at 142. 
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Los Angeles working with a predictive policing system that 
highlighted potential crime geographically became overly focused on 
the areas highlighted by the system, to the point where they had to be 
explicitly trained to patrol “outside the box.”173 
But automation bias can result in more frightening results.  
Consider the arrest of Denise Green, a 47-year-old African American 
municipal worker with health and mobility issues.  Late one evening, 
Ms. Green was pulled over, forced out of her car, told to kneel in the 
street, and handcuffed as four officers pointed their weapons at 
her.174  Ms. Green was stopped because police responded to a faulty 
alert from an Automatic License Plate Reader (ALPR).175  As the 
court noted, ALPR systems are known for “false hits,” and police 
protocol required the officers to independently verify the validity of 
the information prior to executing a stop.176 
Ms. Green’s experience is indicative not only of police over-
dependence on big data analytics, but also of the structural and 
implicit racism that leads to over policing.177  Because of the known 
flaws in our preexisting social structures, the officers were trained that 
an ALPR “hit” by itself did not justify a vehicle stop.  But the officer 
who stopped Ms. Green not only failed to verify the validity of the 
license plate number, he instituted a “high risk” felony stop of the 
vehicle.178  This stop was so intrusive a court held that a rational jury 
could find that it amounted to an unlawful arrest.179  While Ms. Green 
was “merely” frightened and humiliated, given the history of police 
violence against unarmed black people,180 the incident could have 
turned out far worse. 
Deference to science and technology is a component of 
governmental misuse of algorithmic decision-making tools, but it also 
reinforces preexisting individual biases. Predictive technologies 
reproduce societal discrimination, but the tools are also used by 
 
 173. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 80. 
 174. Green v. County of San Francisco, 751 F.3d. 1039, 1043 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 175. Id. (reversing and remanding the trial court’s grant of summary judgment for 
the City finding that the officers never visually confirmed the license plate match). 
 176. Id. at 1042. 
 177. See generally Robert J. Smith et al., Implicit White Favoritism in the Criminal 
Justice System, 66 ALA. L. REV. 871 (2015) (describing the implicit racial bias in the 
criminal justice system and arguing that in addition to implicit and structural bias 
there is also a structural white favoritism). 
 178. Green, 751 F.3d. at 1043. 
 179. Id. at 1047–48. 
 180. See, e.g., Paul-Emile, supra note 26, at 308 (noting increased violence against 
unarmed black people). 
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individuals with their own inherent biases, implicit or explicit.  Thus, 
deference to technology is superimposed on and reinforces individual 
bias.  This creates a situation in which people of color are far more 
likely to be harmed by officers relying on algorithmic decision-making 
tools, especially where system outputs coincide with and thus 
“confirm” an individual officer’s own biases.181 
Automation bias also exists within the judicial system.  Judges are 
not immune from the “gravitational pull”182 of scientific evidence that 
appears neutral and objective.183  Case law is littered with instances of 
courts admitting now discredited “scientific” evidence, such as bite-
mark testimony or firearm and toolmark identifications.184  The 
discrediting of this evidence came not from new advances in science, 
but from persistent challenges that the evidence was never valid in the 
first place.185  Because courts failed to require validation of new 
claims of scientifically reliable evidence, much of what is now 
considered “junk science” gained a foothold in the justice system.186 
This is of particular concern in criminal and family court, which are 
far more lenient in admitting scientific evidence proffered by the state 
than by those challenging the state.187  Given that states are already 
 
 181. Rich, supra note 8, at 899–900 (discussing how individual officer bias inhibits 
an officer from determining that an automated suspicion algorithm is wrong when the 
information coincides with the officer’s own biases); L. Song Richardson, Police 
Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 87 IND. L.J. 1143, 1146–51 (2012) (discussing 
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 182. Clare Huntington, The Empirical Turn in Family Law, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
227, 287 (2018). 
 183. See id. at 232–33 (2018) (stating that because empirical evidence appears 
neutral, the State can argue that it is following the algorithm and thus evade engaging 
in difficult and complex child welfare issues); see also Citron, supra note 1, at 1254 
(noting that hearing officers in benefits proceedings are likely to trust the computer-
supported decision until and unless appellants can produce expert testimony showing 
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 184. See Simon A. Cole, Changed Science Statutes: Can Courts Accommodate 
Accelerating Forensic Scientific and Technological Change, 57 JURIMETRICS J. 443, 
446 (2017) (discussing scientific experts who proffered incriminating testimony at trial 
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 185. Id. at 453–55. 
 186. Id. at 457. 
 187. Stephanie L. Damon-Moore, Trial Judges and the Forensic Science Problem, 
92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1532, 1535 n.18 (2017).  While Damon-Moore focuses on criminal 
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justice system in its function of controlling marginalized populations.  Child welfare is 
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Bad Medicine: Parents, the State, and the Charge of Medical Child Abuse, 50 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 205 (2016). 
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introducing machine learning algorithms into their law enforcement 
and child welfare systems, the next step may well be attempting to 
introduce risk scores as “scientific” evidence supporting probable 
cause or child maltreatment, based on claims that predictive 
algorithms are objective, neutral, and technologically sound. 
Uncritical reliance on technological decision-making tools also 
interacts with and reinforces other biases.  One such example is the 
“anchor effect,” a cognitive bias that describes the human tendency to 
adjust judgments or assessments in response to previously disclosed 
external information — an “anchor.”188  In criminal sentencing, 
appellate courts are beginning to examine how initial sentencing 
recommendations may improperly “anchor” judges to an improper 
and inflated sentencing range.189  The anchoring effect occurs even 
when the initial anchor is implausible, although the effect on a 
decision-maker is greater when the initial anchor is plausible.190 
Consider these combined biases in the context of algorithmic risk 
assessment systems: automation bias makes an algorithmic risk 
assessment score seem “more plausible,” while the anchoring effect 
maximizes the algorithm’s impact on the decision-making process.  
Because these psychological forces occur unconsciously,191 bias and 
errors in judgment stemming from them go undetected.192  As more 
aggressive discriminatory biases are layered on top of problematic but 
socially benign ones, it becomes clear that algorithmic systems of 
social control do not only harm people, but also create real and 
significant obstacles for those attempting to challenge their use. 
Deference to technology also makes disputing technological 
determinations expensive and unattainable for those who cannot 
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afford the experts necessary to establish system error.  Arkansas’s 
adoption of a new algorithmic assessment program for Medicaid 
inexplicably and drastically reduced benefits to many recipients.193  It 
was not until the developer of the algorithm was actually testifying at 
trial, when he was asked to walk the court through the algorithmic 
decision-making system, that the specific system errors were 
discovered.194  This occurred after months of costly federal litigation, 
thousands of attorney hours,195 and, most importantly, loss of medical 
coverage for many recipients. 
Problematically and predictably, Arkansas was implementing the 
algorithm in a “low rights environments,” where there is little 
expectation of political accountability and those affected have no 
right to counsel.196  Governments implement algorithmic decision-
making in ways that primarily target already marginalized 
populations — whether they are focused on reducing welfare rolls or 
services to the homeless, minimizing support for the disabled, 
targeting communities of color with predictive policing tactics, or 
screening people into or out of the state’s child welfare systems.  The 
communities most affected by such predictive algorithms must 
generally rely on underfinanced and understaffed public defender or 
civil legal services offices to challenge these systems.  For those 
unable to challenge government actions, officials may claim they have 
waived any right to appeal, even if it is later determined the 
algorithms used were flawed.197 
 
 193. Complaint at ¶¶ 39–46, 56–61, Jacobs ex rel. v. Gillespie, 3:16-cv-00119 (E.D. 
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2019] FORDHAM URB. L.J. 399 
This use of technologies to control marginalized populations is not 
a coincidence and is not new.  The technology allows those in 
positions of power to sift and sort people — those deserving of aid 
and support versus those whom society sees as undeserving, 
dangerous, or criminal.198  Governments have used technology to 
contain, control, and criminalize people for hundreds of years, 
sometimes with spectacularly horrific results. 
B.  Historical Success of Technology as Domestic Social Control 
Mechanism 
The ability to collect, store, sort, and sift through information 
about individuals is what has allowed governments to track, 
stigmatize, and ultimately punish entire populations.  Some critics of 
algorithmic governance systems posit the technology as tremendously 
useful, but acknowledge it has the capacity to reinforce existing bias 
and over-criminalize communities of color.199  Other critics suggest 
that governments view this technologically enhanced capacity for 
controlling and criminalizing targeted communities as a feature, not a 
bug.200  The latter of these two views is soundly supported by history. 
Virginia Eubanks uses the concept of a “digital poorhouse” to 
compare how the poor and disabled are controlled and managed by 
state authorized algorithms today with how this population was 
controlled and managed by the institution of the poorhouse in the 
1800s.201  Eubanks also documents how the United States has evolved 
in its management of poor populations — from the use of the 
poorhouse to “scientific charity,”202 where caseworkers began to 
investigate and separate the deserving from the undeserving poor in a 
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quasi “moral classification” system,203 and then from scientific charity 
into the use of eugenics.204 
Combining white supremacy with fear of the other, eugenics was 
embraced to protect society from African Americans and the 
“shiftless, ignorant, and worthless class of anti-social whites.”205  
Eugenics was considered a rigorous and data-driven science in its 
day.206  It also fit many other aspects of the Progressive Era — the 
shift to planned capitalism, the reification of efficiency, and the rise of 
middle class professional managers and scientific experts.207  The 
Eugenics Record Office (ERO), overseen by a Harvard biologist and 
established with funding from the Carnegie Institute, was created to 
support a modern society by weeding out those considered unfit.208  
To accomplish this, the ERO created a database of family pedigrees, 
case studies, and indexed records from notes collected by trained field 
workers.209 
The ERO, with its “scientific” methodology of data collection and 
analysis, quickly began to influence government policy.  In the 1920s, 
scientists from the ERO recommended forced sterilization and anti-
immigration laws, all based on “science” supported by “data and 
records.”210  In 1924, Congress passed an Immigration Act effectively 
barring Eastern Europeans, Jews, Arabs, and East Asians from 
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entering the country.211  At the state level, thousands of people were 
deemed “unfit” and sterilized.212  At the time, eugenics served as a 
science on which to base legal and policy decisions.  Today, historians 
look back and see a pseudo-science sold to legislators and the public 
that was built on flawed methodologies and evidence that “resonated 
with social prejudices.”213 
Following the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century, the 
“science” of eugenics was combined with even greater technological 
sorting power to assist two of the worst modern-day authoritarian 
governments in cataloging and culling their citizenry.  Nazi Germany 
and Apartheid South Africa are specters of what “high-tech social 
sorting” tools can do in countries with severe inequality and 
totalitarian regimes.214  Because governments in the United States are 
actively using predictive analytics to target portions of the American 
populace, expanding briefly on this history is not an exercise in 
hyperbole.  Rather, it is important to understand how dangerous it 
can be to wed technology to discrimination through law and policy.215 
Beginning in 1933, Nazi Germany used a pre-computer punch card 
system to organize and register its entire population.216  Once laws 
were passed that allowed Jews and others deemed unfit to be 
segregated, stripped of their rights, and ultimately murdered, it was 
this punch card system, developed by IBM, that created the 
organizational efficiency that made the Holocaust so catastrophic.217  
The punch card system also allowed the Nazi government to manage 
the massive logistics of the camps so that one’s identity as Jew, 
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Jehovah’s Witness, homosexual, work shy, or otherwise cast as asocial 
or unfit, could never be escaped.218 
This marriage of social prejudice and technology repeated itself in 
South Africa.  There, to denationalize the non-white population, a 
complex system of data collection and analysis was institutionalized to 
sort and track individuals by race.219  The social engineering that 
stripped black South Africans of their citizenship was accomplished in 
large part through advances in computerization that supported the 
manipulation of the huge amounts of data necessary to establish the 
passbook system.220  The passbooks, along with a central registry, 
worked to “recast raw minority domination as a technological 
project.”221 
In each of these examples, prejudice and computerization (or its 
punch code predecessor) enabled an authoritarian government to 
collect information on vulnerable populations and then sort, track, 
and target that population in horrendous ways.222  This is not to say 
that governmental use of technology will always result in atrocities.  
But at a time when there is more analyzable data on everyone than 
ever before, when governmental entities continue to take 
questionable steps to keep various types of surveillance technology 
secret, to ignore this history is naïve at best.  As the social control 
functionality of these tools continues to expand, so does 
governmental interest in their use. 
 
 218. Id. at 364–65.  The five-digit code assigned to each person became part of the 
numbers tattooed on those in the prison camps.  Id. at 356. 
 219. Paul N. Edwards & Gabrielle Hecht, History and the Technopolitics of 
Identity: The Case of Apartheid South Africa, 36 J. SOUTHERN AFR. STUD. 619 
(2010); see also Consolidated and Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 130–141, In re South 
African Apartheid Litigation, 02 MDL No. 1499 (JES) (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2008) (on 
file with author) (explaining IBM’s role in creating the South African passbook 
system). 
 220. Keith Breckenridge, The Book of Life: The South African Population 
Register and the Invention of Racial Descent, 1950–1980, 40 KRONOS SOUTH 
AFRICAN HISTORIES 225, 235 (2014).  For black South Africans, the “Book of Life” 
became the passbook that stripped them of their citizenship and controlled their 
ability to work or travel in and around South Africa. Id. 
 221. Edwards & Hecht, supra note 219, at 628. 
 222. The United States government also used the technology of the day to monitor 
and control suspect communities, under the infamous COINTELPRO program. See 
ROBERT SCHEER, THEY KNOW EVERYTHING ABOUT YOU 34–35, 170 (2015).  Past 
domestic governmental surveillance also seems eerily parallel to current surveillance 
targeting black communities. See Amna Toor, “Our Identity Is Often What’s 
Triggering Surveillance”: How Government Surveillance of #Blacklivesmatter 
Violates the First Amendment Freedom of Association, 44 RUTGERS COMPUTER & 
TECH. L.J. 286, 295–96 (2018). 
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Predictive analytics and machine learning continue to evolve as 
developers push the “predictive” capacity of algorithms further into 
the lives of targeted populations.  The algorithm developed to predict 
child maltreatment in Allegheny County, for example, is apparently 
being expanded to apply to every child born in that county.223  In 
addition, a well-known developer of risk assessment modeling is 
working on an algorithm to predict, at the moment of birth, whether a 
person will commit a crime by his or her eighteenth birthday, based 
on environmental factors and parental history.224  Such an approach, 
which assumes a connection between genetics and criminality, has 
been described as a eugenics approach to fighting crime — an 
approach which could lead to forced sterilization,225 this time directed 
not by the science of the 1920s but by the big data analytics of the 
2020s. 
Efforts to extend the capacity of algorithmic social control 
technologies coincides with China’s development of one of the most 
ambitious predictive policing systems in the world.  The Chinese 
government has amassed a database with information on each and 
every citizen, and is using predictive analytics to monitor and ensure 
“social stability.”226  All this makes one law enforcement vendor’s 
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marketing claim that it can leverage big data analytics “to anticipate 
criminal activity” and “predict future events”227 less unrealistic than it 
may initially seem. 
Big data analytics promises to governments the ability to collect 
tremendous amounts of data on individuals and then sort, track, and 
target them at will.  In each of the examples above, private individuals 
and companies — third parties — played outsized roles in the 
automation of authoritarianism.  Whether it is the lure of money, 
prestige, or prejudice, third parties have been and remain one of the 
driving forces in governmental adoption of the technologies necessary 
for algorithmically guided social control. 
C.  Private Sector Profitability 
Privatization of police and social services functions limits 
democratic transparency, increases the market for algorithmic 
decision-making technology, and ultimately undermines 
governmental responsibility to individuals.  We are well into an era of 
hyper-privatization, with a well-documented reduction in government 
spending and a concurrent attempt to shift much of governmental 
responsibility to the private sector.228  This is exacerbated by the fact 
that most governments, especially local or state governments, do not 
have the capacity to develop predictive analytic systems without help 
from private companies or non-profit organizations.229  This need for 
outside expertise coincides with neoliberal demands to privatize 
provision of the social safety net.230 
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(2005) (documenting the dismantling of the Keynesian welfare state).  See also Ingrid 
V. Eagly & Joanna C. Schwartz, Lexipol: The Privatization of Police Policymaking, 
96 TEX. L. REV. 891 (2018) (describing the hidden but significant role of one private 
company in police policymaking). 
 229. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 107. 
 230. Ann Cammett, Welfare Queens Redux: Criminalizing Black Mothers in the 
Age of Neoliberalism, 25 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 363, 363–65 (2016) (describing 
neoliberal goals of privatizing core aspects of the social safety nets such as pensions, 
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Government contracts associated with developing and 
implementing algorithmic decision-making tools are highly profitable.  
The companies selected to privatize Indiana’s benefits system, for 
example, received a billion-dollar contract.231  While costs vary, child 
welfare analytics cost states hundreds of thousands of dollars.232  
Companies profit not only from the development of the algorithms, 
but also from maintaining the data sets the algorithms process.233  In 
addition to money, companies that provide data analytics to 
governments gain access to data they may not have had otherwise.234 
Given these rewards, it is no surprise that private companies and 
non-profits are developing algorithmic decision-making technologies 
and offering them to governments with an eye towards future 
markets.  The child maltreatment algorithm implemented in 
Allegheny County, first developed for use in New Zealand,235 is 
already being marketed to other states.236  The company that 
provided aerial surveillance footage to the Baltimore Police 
 
education, healthcare, childcare and the prison system).  Indiana’s former Governor, 
Mitch Daniels, had what was described as a “Yellow Pages” approach to 
privatization: if a product or service was offered in the Yellow Pages, government 
should not provide it. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 45.  Mississippi recently passed a law 
not only requiring its Department of Human Services to develop an automated 
eligibility and fraud detection system, but mandating that the state use an outside 
vendor to do so. See 2017 MISS. LAWS CH. 421 §3(2)(b)(2). 
 231. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 48. 
 232. Jackson & Marx, supra note 87 (noting that the Illinois system costed 
$366,000).  The developer of the surveillance flights operated above Baltimore 
estimated that a long-term contract with a single police department could be worth 
two million dollars a year.  Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every 
Move from Above, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2016), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-secret-surveillance/ 
[https://perma.cc/9GKZ-VS5C]. 
 233. Axon’s (formerly Taser’s) contract for five years of data storage with the city 
of Birmingham, Alabama, is valued at $899,000, not including the one-time costs of 
the cameras. See Joh, supra note 58, at 115. 
 234. Ali Winston, Palantir Has Secretly Been Using New Orleans to Test Its 
Predictive Policing Technology, VERGE (Feb. 27, 2018), 
https://www.theverge.com/2018/2/27/17054740/palantir-predictive-policing-tool-new-
orleans-nopd [https://perma.cc/5ER2-R3FZ] (reporting that New Orleans granted 
Palantir access to city civil and criminal databases, as well as access to the city’s 
LexisNexis Accurint product, which is comprised of millions of searchable public 
records, court filings, licenses, addresses, phone numbers, and social media data). 
 235. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 236. Richard Wexler, Opinion, The Scarlet Number: Is Pittsburgh’s Ethically Risky 
System of Big Data for Foster Care Coming to California?, WITNESSLA (Apr. 5, 
2018), https://witnessla.com/op-ed-the-scarlet-number-is-pittsburghs-ethically-risky-
system-of-big-data-for-foster-care-coming-to-california/ [https://perma.cc/WB75-
2W6L] (reporting that the California Department of Social Services has contracted 
with one of the developers of the Allegheny County AFST tool). 
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Department is considering using the expertise gained and raw data 
developed while surveilling the city to market its system to auto 
insurance companies.237  Facial recognition software was donated to 
an Arizona school system with the hope of developing a market for 
the technology in schools.238  Amazon designed a facial recognition 
system that it is currently marketing to various law enforcement 
agencies.239 
Using private vendors to build algorithmic social control 
technologies is problematic for a variety of reasons not the least of 
which is that it increases opacity and lack of accountability.  Not only 
are government officials, who are implementing the predictive 
systems, generally unable to explain them,240 they are often 
prohibited from providing information because the algorithms and 
the analysis produced are considered a proprietary secret by third 
party developers.241  A recent study directed Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) requests to a variety of state and local agencies as part of 
a project to test how responsive government agencies would be to 
requests for information about predictive analytics.242  While not the 
 
 237. Kevin Rector, As Police Weigh Surveillance Program, Private Company at 
Helm Looks to Court Private Clients, BALT. SUN (Oct. 7, 2016), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-surveillance-
alternatives-20161007-story.html [https://perma.cc/4EPZ-SDRH]. 
 238. See Torin Monahan, The Surveillance Curriculum: Risk Management and 
Social Control in the Neoliberal School, in SURVEILLANCE AND SECURITY, supra note 
21, at 110. 
 239. See Matt Cagle & Nicole A. Ozer, Amazon Teams up with Law Enforcement 
to Deploy Dangerous New Face Recognition Technology, ACLU OF N. CAL. (May 
22, 2018), https://www.aclunc.org/blog/amazon-teams-law-enforcement-deploy-
dangerous-new-face-recognition-technology [https://perma.cc/WYF4-7XDT]; Martin 
Kaste, Orlando Police Testing Amazon’s Real-Time Facial Recognition, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (May 22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/05/22/613115969/orlando-police-
testing-amazons-real-time-facial-recognition [https://perma.cc/55BG-WHP2]. 
 240. See supra notes 41–48 and accompanying text. 
 241. See Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168, 1177 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (private vendor refused to provide algorithm 
used to terminate teachers, arguing the codes were trade secrets); K.W. v. Armstrong, 
180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 717 (D. Idaho 2016) (the state refused to release algorithmic 
scoring information in Medicaid dispute, claiming vendor copyright protections).  
Claims that most algorithms contain proprietary information that cannot be released 
without the permission of the developer are what undercut New York City’s attempt 
to legislate transparency in algorithmic decision-making technologies.  Julia Powles, 
New York City’s Bold, Flawed Attempt to Make Algorithms Accountable, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/new-york-citys-
bold-flawed-attempt-to-make-algorithms-accountable [https://perma.cc/DK2G-
TMF5]. 
 242. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 136 (describing their methodology 
and listing the systems they sought information on as the Public Safety Assessment, 
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only obstacle to transparency, the study found that aggressive trade 
secret claims and NDAs were a major hurdle in obtaining information 
about the predictive systems.243  This lack of transparency about the 
algorithms creates a lack of accountability that implicates all the 
issues of bias and unfairness inherent in big data analytics. 
Finally, privatization of services meant to provide support to 
recipients has consequences for how we care for others in need, and 
fundamentally alters the relationship between those delivering 
services and those receiving them.  Privatization of government 
programs such as welfare and Medicaid is often seen as a way to 
reduce both the size of government and cut spending on the poor.244  
Contracts often include explicit incentives for outside contractors to 
cut caseloads, regardless of recipient need.245  For example, the 
performance metrics in Indiana’s automated benefits system created 
incentives for the company running the system to close benefits cases 
prematurely.246  In addition to churning cases, the company 
eliminated professional caseworkers and limited human discretion by 
removing it from frontline service workers, vesting decision-making 
almost entirely in the computer system.247  All of this served one 
purpose — making it as hard as possible to receive any public 
assistance, regardless of whether one was entitled to it or not. 
Governmental deployment of predictive technologies to manage, 
track, and control marginalized populations is increasing as the tools 
 
the Eckerd Rapid Safety Feedback system, the Allegheny Family Screening Tool, 
PredPol, HunchLab, and the New York City Value-Added Measure). 
 243. Id. at 153–54. 
 244. See Geneva Brown, Ain’t I A Victim? The Intersectionality of Race, Class, 
and Gender in Domestic Violence and the Courtroom, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 
147, 160 (2012) (identifying key components of welfare reform as reduction in 
expenditures, decrease in government bureaucracy, and increased privatization). See 
generally Wendy A. Bach, Welfare Reform, Privatization, and Power: Reconfiguring 
Administrative Law Structures from the Ground Up, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 275 (2009) 
(attributing the privatization of benefits systems to shifts in federal law encouraging 
states to reduce welfare spending and maximize private sector involvement in service 
provision). 
 245. Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty 
Programs, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1755 (2002) (describing privatization of its public 
benefits program in which “contractors’ profits and losses depended on the amount 
of money paid out to recipients — the less money for recipients, the more profits for 
contractors”). 
 246. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 50–51.  This is not to say that issues of economics 
do not skew government analytic systems.  Michigan’s implementation of the MiDAS 
system with its 92% error rate increased the Unemployment Insurance Agency 
coffers from three to sixty-nine million dollars. Charette, supra note 47. 
 247. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 80–81. 
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themselves are becoming more powerful and opaque.  Given the 
extent of government use of these systems, as well as the historic and 
economic forces driving their adoption, it is unlikely that communities 
will be able to completely proscribe their use.  However, creative and 
tenacious advocacy strategies can force governments to become more 
transparent about how they use predictive systems and require 
governments to adopt systems that minimize bias and provide for the 
ability to test and audit the results. 
III.  TOWARD GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY 
Those grappling with how to diminish the risks associated with big 
data analytics have offered many solutions, including demands for 
system transparency,248 auditing,249 and required design 
modifications.250  It is clear that all these methods and others are 
needed.  At the same time, advocates and activists confronting 
predictive algorithm systems must become ever more conversant in 
how they work.  Successful challenges must be multi-faceted, relying 
on litigation and regulation, in addition to being supplemented and 
guided by grassroots activism.  Many of the legal doctrines and 
strategies used to challenge governmental overreach in the past will 
be useful guides for opposing current systems.  Regulations can create 
mechanisms for public notice and enforce transparency.  However, it 
is grassroots activism that will sustain the systematic opposition to 
algorithmic social control systems necessary to limit their use. 
A.  Litigation 
Courts are only beginning to address government use of 
algorithmic decision-making technologies,251 although they have been 
 
 248. See Danielle Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due 
Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1, 25 (2014) (describing the 
need for regulators to have access to data sets and source codes). 
 249. See Pauline Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 
ONLINE 189, 190 (2017) (discussing how auditing system outputs can help determine 
if protected groups are disproportionally affected). 
 250. Kroll et al., supra note 2, at 662 (arguing that predictive analytics should 
include software verification technology). 
 251. See, e.g., Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 
F. Supp. 3d 1168 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (noting that use of private algorithms to terminate 
teachers is an issue of first impression in the circuit); United States v. Esquivel-Rios, 
786 F.3d 1299, 1302 (10th Cir. 2015) (noting that the possibility that database 
unreliability would support a suppression motion in a criminal case is an issue the 
circuit had not addressed).  The goal of this piece is not a complete review of what 
case law exists, but rather to highlight common arguments and strategies that have 
been most successful. 
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grappling with related issues, such as database errors, for many 
years.252  Recent decisions reveal a judiciary that is struggling to grasp 
the technology and is relying on advocates to contextualize system 
failures within the appropriate constitutional and statutory 
frameworks, be they criminal or civil.253  With the rise of predictive 
policing tools, the concern in the criminal justice arena is that these 
technologies will further dismantle the protections enshrined in the 
Fourth Amendment.254 
Though not addressing predictive policing systems per se, several 
United States Supreme Court Justices have recently raised privacy 
concerns based on the aggregated nature of surveillance inherent in 
big data analytics.255  This concern crystalized in 2018 in Carpenter v. 
United States.256  There, the Court found that when police obtained 
Cell Site Location Information (CSLI) held by wireless carriers, they 
conducted a search that invaded the defendant’s reasonable 
expectation of privacy, and that required a warrant.257  In doing so, 
the Court noted the “seismic shifts in digital technology that made 
 
 252. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 155 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that the risk of error in criminal justice databases is “not slim” 
and that “[i]naccuracies in expansive, interconnected collections of electronic 
information raise grave concerns for individual liberty.”); Arizona v. Evans, 5114 
U.S. 1, 17 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Surely it would not be reasonable for 
the police to rely, say, on a recordkeeping system, their own or some other agency’s, 
that has no mechanism to ensure its accuracy over time and that routinely leads to 
false arrests, even years after the probable cause for any such arrest has ceased to 
exist (if it ever existed).”); see also Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 
1170, 1175 (9th Cir. 2009) (reversed on other grounds) (stating that parents found 
factually innocent of child abuse were “living every parent’s nightmare” because 
California would not remove them from its child abuse database). 
 253. See infra notes 255–298 and accompanying text. 
 254. See, e.g., Margaret Hu, Cybersurveillance Intrusions and an Evolving Katz 
Privacy Test, 55 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 127 (2018); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data 
and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327 (2016); see generally 
Elizabeth Joh, Policing by Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 
WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014). 
 255. See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).  In Jones, the issue 
was not one of big data; instead, the case involved police tracking a vehicle for 28 
days based on the manual installation of a GPS device.  Concurrences by Justices 
Alito and Sotomayor referenced the need for the court to begin to grapple with how 
big data technologies may alter reasonable expectations of privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
 256. See generally Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. ___ , *2018 WL 3073916 
(2018).  This case involved the warrantless collection of cell phone location data over 
127 days, creating a small but recognizable subset of the kind of persistent 
surveillance and data collection that big data analytics and predictive policing 
technologies rely on. 
 257. Id. 
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possible the tracking of not only Carpenter’s location but also 
everyone else’s, not for a short period but for years and years.”258  
This decision provides some hope that courts will be hesitant to 
accept overreaching reliance on algorithmically determined probable 
cause or reasonable suspicion. 
With the advent of predictive policing technologies, some 
defendants have argued that use of the technology requires a warrant, 
or is not appropriately encompassed by the existing warrant through 
which evidence was obtained.259  Unfortunately, although courts 
sometimes find that when police use advanced technologies they need 
warrants, motions to suppress often fail under the good-faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule.260  That said, aggressive defense 
motion practice has forced some prosecutors who wish to keep the 
use of specific technology secret, to drop certain cases.261  Defendants 
have also begun demanding access to the data collected by predictive 
policing systems, arguing it may contain exonerating information.262 
 
 258. Id. at 2219.  The big data analytics discussed herein are built on larger 
databases and use more powerful analytics than the records of cell phone location 
data at issue in Carpenter.  See id. (explaining that the records at issue reflected the 
state of technology at the start of the decade and that current technology is even 
more powerful and precise). 
 259. See, e.g., State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016) (evidence 
suppressed because police use of cell site simulator did not fall within a pen register 
trap and trace order); United States v. Werdene, 883 F.3d 204 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(deciding that a warrant to search computers outside of the issuing magistrate’s 
jurisdiction using a “Network Investigative Device” violated Fourth Amendment, but 
evidence was nonetheless admitted under a good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule). 
 260. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution generally excludes 
the use of evidence obtained under an invalid warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 
U.S. 897, 906–07 (1984).  However, in Leon, the Supreme Court created the good 
faith exception to the exclusionary rule, holding that the suppression of evidence was 
not appropriate where an officer relied in good faith on a properly issued warrant, 
even if the warrant was later determined to be invalid.  Id. at 922. 
 261. See Burlacu, supra note 67 (describing how federal prosecutors dismissed 
charges in a child pornography case rather than disclosing details about the Network 
Investigative Technique (NIT) used to overcome defendant’s use of  an IP masking 
system; see also Robert Patrick, Controversial Secret Phone Tracker Figured in 
Dropped St. Louis Case, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 19, 2015), 
http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/controversial-secret-phone-
tracker-figured-in-dropped-st-louis-case/article_fbb82630-aa7f-5200-b221-
a7f90252b2d0.html [https://perma.cc/S6DZ-GR9F]. 
 262. Emily Lane, Mayor, Police Chief to Face Subpoenas from Convicted Gang 
Member over Palantir Claim, TIMES-PICAYUNE, NOLA MEDIA (Apr. 3, 2018), 
https://www.nola.com/crime/2018/04/palantir_new_orleans_mayor_lan.html 
[https://perma.cc/E5WC-S628] (reporting that defense counsel in New Orleans, which 
secretly used a predictive policing system, subpoenaed information about the 
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Criminal justice automated risk assessment systems have been 
implemented in pre-trial detention, probation, and sentencing 
contexts for many years.  Most of these systems were created for use 
in probation determinations, but like many technologies, “mission 
creep” has allowed them to be adapted and used in sentencing.263  In 
State v. Loomis, the defendant challenged the court’s use of an 
algorithmic risk assessment score to support its sentencing 
determination.264  He argued this violated his due process rights on 
two grounds: that the proprietary nature of the automated system, 
called COMPAS, prevented him from challenging the system’s 
scientific validity, and that the system unconstitutionally took gender 
into account.265 
The Wisconsin Supreme Court ultimately upheld the trial court’s 
use of the technology because it found the COMPAS score was only 
one of many factors considered during sentencing.266  However, 
unlike an earlier challenge to automated sentencing technologies,267 
the Wisconsin court engaged with the critiques of risk assessment 
tools, including those alleging racial bias.268  While permitting use of 
COMPAS, the court required that all future Presentence 
Investigation Reports contain a written caution about risk assessment 
 
system’s data collection and analysis, arguing this information could exonerate 
defendants). 
 263. Mission or data creep is the repurposing of data analytics beyond its original 
purpose.  This secondary use is extremely problematic because it relies on data not 
collected or screened for the purpose it is ultimately used for.  See Matthew T. Bodie 
et al., The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 96, 1000–01 
(2017); see also Wendy K. Mariner, Mission Creep: Public Health Surveillance and 
Medical Privacy, 87 B.U. L. REV. 347 (2007) (describing mission creep in public 
health surveillance policies). 
 264. See State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 752–53 (Wisc. 2016). 
 265. Id. at 757.  COMPAS is a privately-owned risk assessment system designed to 
provide a numerical score indicating the likelihood that an individual will commit 
another crime in the future. 
 266. Id.  The court made clear that using COMPAS could not be sentence 
determinative.  Id. at 767. 
 267. Malenchik v. State, 928 N.E.2d 564 (Ind. 2010).  The defendant in Malenchik 
made a number of arguments, including that the risk assessment tool was unreliable 
and discriminatory.  The court disagreed, citing the “growing body of impressive 
research” supporting its use.  Id. at 573. 
 268. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 762–63 (referencing Angwin et al., supra note 76, as 
well as its follow-up story, Jeff Larson et al., How We Analyzed the COMPAS 
Recidivism Algorithm, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), 
https://www.propublica.org/article/how-we-analyzed-the-compas-recidivism-
algorithm [https://perma.cc/75X8-ZVBS]).  The court also discussed a study done by 
California’s Department of Corrections questioning COMPAS.  See id. 
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systems, including a warning to judges about the program’s lack of 
transparency and the potential for bias.269 
The Loomis decision is instructive because the court engaged with 
critiques of algorithmic technology and set limits for its use.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court was also clear that it purposefully did not 
address an equal protection challenge to the system.270  In addition, 
one of the concurrences argued that sentencing judges reviewing risk 
assessment scores should be required to place on the record their 
evaluations of strengths, weaknesses, and relevance of the scores to 
the individuals being sentenced.271  Given that a concurrence, like a 
dissent, has the capacity to “sow the seeds for future harvest,”272 the 
Wisconsin Court’s willingness to take seriously challenges to a well-
known, long-used risk assessment system is a step in the right 
direction, even as the ultimate decision permitted the system’s use. 
Challenges to governmental use of decision-making technology in 
non-criminal cases are more common.  These cases challenge 
government actions that negatively affect a plaintiff’s constitutional273 
 
 269. Per the court’s ruling in Loomis, the following cautions must be provided to 
sentencing judges: (1) the proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to 
prevent disclosure of information relating to how factors are weighed or how risk 
scores are determined; (2) because COMPAS risk assessment scores are based on 
group data, they are able to identify groups of high-risk offenders — not a particular 
high-risk individual; (3) some studies of COMPAS risk assessment scores have raised 
questions about whether they disproportionately classify minority offenders as having 
a higher risk of recidivism; (4) a COMPAS risk assessment compares defendants to a 
national sample, but no cross-validation study for a Wisconsin population has yet 
been completed; risk assessment tools must be constantly monitored and re-normed 
for accuracy due to changing populations and subpopulations; (5) COMPAS was not 
developed for use at sentencing, rather it was intended for use by the Department of 
Corrections in making determinations regarding treatment, supervision, and parole.  
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 769–70 (numbering added for ease of reading). 
 270. Id. at 766 (noting that Loomis did not bring an equal protection challenge, and 
specifically basing the decision on due process).  Several scholars suggest that gender 
differentials included in risk assessment tools violate equal protection; see Sonja B. 
Starr, Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REV. 803, 823–30 (2014); John Lightbourne, Damned 
Lies & Criminal Sentencing Using Evidence-Based Tools, 15 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 
327 (2017). 
 271. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 774–75 (Abrahamson, J., concurring).  Judge 
Abrahamson also cited the “mixed reviews” that sentencing algorithms have received 
in scholarly literature and popular commentary. Id. 
 272. William J. Brennan, In Defense of Dissents, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 427, 431 (1986). 
 273. Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 2012) (entitlement 
benefits like Medicaid, Food Stamps, TANF, properly characterized as “property” 
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause); Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. 
Supp. 3d 791, 807 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (questionnaire used to determine whether 
unemployment claimants committed fraud violates the Fifth Amendment’s privilege 
against self-incrimination). 
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or statutory rights.274  Most of the cases discussed herein involve two 
kinds of instances: when the state uses algorithmic decision-making 
systems to terminate the employment of public school teachers, and 
when it relies on such technologies to reduce or discontinue a 
recipient’s public benefits such as welfare, Medicaid, or 
unemployment benefits. 
Because these cases involve a property right, plaintiffs have been 
most successful with procedural due process claims arising under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.275  These cases are often characterized as 
“notice” claims, and the notice requirements prior to termination are 
fairly substantial.  Proper notice requires an opportunity to be heard 
at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,276 and it must 
adequately detail the reasons for termination or reduction of rights.277  
In Houston Federation of Teachers v. Houston Independent School 
District, the court found that the School District failed to provide 
enough information about the algorithm used to terminate teachers, 
even though it provided significant general, as well as some specific, 
system details.278  The court held that what was given was not 
sufficient to satisfy procedural due process because the information 
did not allow individual teachers to verify or replicate their scores.279 
 
 274. Perdue, 964 N.E.2d at 829 (considering Americans with Disabilities and 
Rehabilitation Act claims); K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 706 (D. Idaho 
2016) (bringing claims under Medicaid Act); see generally State of New Mexico ex 
rel. Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe 
County Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) (stating that claim hinges entirely on New Mexico state 
law). 
 275. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 
3d 1168, 1175 (S.D. Tex. 2017). 
 276. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976).  Mathews also established a 
balancing test to determine the level of protections a particular situation demands: 
courts must consider the private interests that will be affected, the risk of erroneous 
deprivation and probable value of additional safeguards, and the governmental 
interest (including fiscal and administrative burdens) that additional or substitute 
procedural requirements would entail.  Id. at 335. 
 277. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267–68 (1970). 
 278. The district provided an overview of the general measurements — a general 
description of the testing methodology, how to read the teacher assessment report, a 
list of students whose scores were linked to the teacher and used in the scoring, and 
the percentage of those students the individual teacher was responsible for.  Hous. 
Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1178.  In a similar decision, the Indiana court in 
Perdue found that generalized information connected to numerical codes used to 
explain an adverse action failed to provide any information as to how the decision 
was reached, and thus was constitutionally inadequate.  Perdue, 964 N.E.2d at 835–
36. 
 279. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1179. 
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Procedural due process also requires clear ascertainable standards 
to insure fairness and avoid arbitrary decision making.280  In K.W. v. 
Armstrong, plaintiffs sought detailed information of the State’s new 
algorithmic process of determining eligibility for Medicaid.281  The 
state refused to provide the information in part because it was 
copyrighted by a third party.282  The court found that potential for 
error in the system was “obvious” and “substantial.”283  Then, 
applying the balancing test dictated by the Supreme Court in 
Mathews v. Eldridge,284 the court held that the risk of erroneous 
denial of benefits outweighed any potential harm to the third party, 
and thus found a due process violation.285 
Substantive due process and equal protection challenges to 
algorithmic technologies have fared less well.286  Both of these 
challenges only require the state to show that it has a rational basis 
for its determination, unless the plaintiff is a member of a protected 
class or can show that the state is infringing on a fundamental right.287  
The rational basis standard is very deferential to the state, and is 
rarely met by the plaintiff.288  However, in a case arising from the 
“robo-fraud” system utilized by the Michigan Unemployment 
 
 280. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 715 (citing Carey v. Quern, 588 F.2d 230 (7th 
Cir. 1978)). 
 281. Id. (requiring the state to draft clear standards of the terms used to terminate 
or reduce benefits). 
 282. Id. at 717. 
 283. Id. at 716–17.  The court walked through the steps required to implement the 
“budgetary tool” and noted the multiple places for potential error, both procedurally 
(transferring information from various pages of a questionnaire) and substantively 
(misunderstanding a participant’s ability to accomplish a specific task).  Id. 
 284. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976). 
 285. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 716–17 (finding substantial risk of 
“mathematical, clerical, or substantive” error).  The court also noted that any risk of 
harm to the company could be substantially or entirely mitigated by a protective 
order. Id.; see also Order, Jacobs v. Gillespie, 3:16-cv-119-DPM (E.D. Ark. Nov. 1, 
2016) (ordering that state health benefits may not be reduced until the agency 
provides specific notices explaining benefit reduction, referencing and including a 
copy of the assessment algorithm). 
 286. Cook v. Bennett, 792 F.3d 1294, 1300 (11th Cir. 2015) (deciding that a 
substantive due process and equal protection challenge to a teacher assessment 
system, which evaluated teachers based on the test scores of students they did not 
teach or even in subjects they did not teach, passes rational basis). 
 287. Id. at 1300–01. 
 288. See Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. 
Supp. 3d 1168, 1180–83 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (describing several cases where plaintiffs 
failed in challenging teacher assessment systems because the system passed rational 
basis review). 
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Agency, the equal protection claim survived a motion to dismiss.289  
There, the court found that because the system was not uniformly 
applied and continued to operate after problems were identified, the 
plaintiffs met their burden of showing intentional and arbitrary 
disparate treatment of similarly situated people, which was “devoid of 
any rational basis.”290 
Most of the cases challenging the use of automated decision-
making tools also claim the systems suffer from statutory deficiencies, 
alongside the previously discussed constitutional challenges.  The 
statutes are often relied upon because they contain notice and hearing 
requirements similar to those protected by procedural due process.291  
Unlike procedural due process, however, statutes, especially those 
written to implement specific types of assessment frameworks, may 
include language requiring any state assessment system (including 
algorithmic decision-making systems) to be transparent and 
objective.292  This is most evident in the recent trend of states 
adopting Value Added Model (VAM) algorithms to determine 
teacher competency.293  At least two states that have implemented 
teacher assessment systems included transparency and objectivity 
requirements in their statutes.294 
 
 289. Cahoo v. SAS Inst. Inc., 322 F. Supp. 3d 772, 800–02 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 2, 
2018). 
 290. Id. at 801. 
 291. See, e.g., K.W. v. Armstrong, 789 F.3d 962, 970 (9th Cir. 2015) (describing the 
notice and hearing requirements of the Medicaid Act and regulations). 
 292. See Lederman v. King, 47 N.Y.S.3d 838, 844 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016) (referencing 
statutory requirement that the teacher assessment system must be transparent and 
available to those being rated prior to the school year); State of New Mexico ex rel. 
Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe County 
Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) (noting the statutory requirement that the teacher assessment 
system must be objective and uniform statewide).  In a case from Idaho, plaintiff 
challenged the disability needs assessment algorithm by (in part) citing language from 
42 U.S.C. § 1396n(j)(5)(D) of the Medicaid Act, which requires that a patient’s 
medical assessment plan methodology use valid, reliable cost data, and be open to 
public inspection.  See Plaintiff’s Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint at 
¶ 36, K.W. v. Armstrong, 1:12-cv-00022-BLW (E. Idaho July 24, 2014) (on file with 
author). 
 293. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 150–51.  Algorithmic teacher 
assessment systems are fairly recent, and are highly complex systems that assign a 
score to teachers that allegedly represents the impact or “value added” an individual 
teacher had on student learning.  See Regina Umpstead et al., The New State of 
Teacher Evaluation and Employment Laws: An Analysis of Legal Actions and 
Trends, 322 ED. L. REP. 577, 584–87 (2015). 
 294. See generally N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3012-c(j)(1) (McKinney 2018) (governing 
teacher assessment and requiring that the “process by which points are assigned in 
subcomponents and the scoring ranges for the subcomponents must be transparent 
and available to those being rated before the beginning of each school year”); N.M. 
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In Lederman v. King, the court found that the teacher challenging 
New York’s VAM assessment system was able to establish that the 
implementation of the value added model was arbitrary and 
capricious.295  While the court focused on the biases and statistical 
shortcomings of the system,296 it also noted expert testimony 
indicating that the system lacked the required transparency for the 
petitioner to understand what she needed to do to achieve a 
satisfactory assessment score as required by state law.297  Similarly, a 
New Mexico judge issued a preliminary injunction halting the 
implementation of a teacher assessment system in New Mexico, 
finding it was not transparent and was not applied uniformly across 
school districts as  required by state law.298 
In addition, while not a challenge to the technology itself, disabled 
plaintiffs have successfully used federal disability rights laws to 
oppose state requirements that impede their ability to interact with 
automated benefits systems.299  As states continue to reduce the 
number of individual caseworkers, recipients are increasingly 
expected to engage directly with the technologies evaluating them.  
Thus, federal and state disability protections may become an 
increasingly important route by which to challenge these automated 
systems. 
Beyond illuminating legal bases for challenging automated 
decision-making systems, recent cases also highlight various practical 
strategies.  The first and most obvious is the need to educate oneself 
and the judiciary as thoroughly as possible on all aspects of the 
technology in question.  For this, experts are required.  Loomis is 
indicative of the importance of educating judges.  As the concurrence 
pointed out, “this court’s lack of understanding of COMPAS was a 
 
STAT. ANN § 22-10A-19 (West 2018) (requiring that the education department “adopt 
criteria and minimum highly objective uniform statewide standards”). 
 295. Lederman v. King, 47 N.Y.S.3d 838, 847 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2016). 
 296. The New York court found that the VAM algorithm was biased against 
teachers with either high or low performing students, was disproportionately affected 
by class size, and that the state could not account for the wide year to year swings in 
teacher scoring. Lederman, 47 N.Y.S.3d at 846. 
 297. Id. at 845 (referencing testimony that New York’s system failed to provide the 
information required by New York Education Law). 
 298. State of New Mexico ex rel. Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-
2015-00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe County Ct. Dec. 2, 2015).  New Mexico law requires 
objective and uniform standards for teacher assessment.  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-10A-
19 (West 2018). 
 299. See Perdue v. Gargano, 964 N.E.2d 825, 832, 843–44 (Ind. Sup. Ct. 2012) 
(finding violations of Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act, where 
the state provided only telephone interview to deaf plaintiff). 
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significant problem in the instant case.  At oral argument, the court 
repeatedly questioned both the State’s and defendant’s counsel about 
how COMPAS works.  Few answers were available.”300 
Algorithmic decision-making systems are inherently complex.  
Many of the opinions discussed here rely heavily on the testimony of 
plaintiff’s experts and their descriptions of the problems with the 
technology.301  Because the systems are often seen as infallible, and 
because the state may refuse to admit system failures, experts are 
crucial to finding and explaining system errors.  In addition, disputes 
between plaintiff’s and defendant’s experts can create a genuine issue 
of material fact, which will allow the plaintiffs to overcome motions 
for summary judgment.302 
Expertise is also essential to reveal data errors.  Courts assume that 
government databases are accurate and reliable, which increases the 
likelihood that they will defer to the analytics that mine these 
databases.303  Systematic demonstration of data error is key to 
convincing courts to review data analytics with a more critical eye.304  
In the challenge to Idaho’s algorithmically controlled disability 
determination, the court, after discussing the large number of data 
errors the plaintiff was able to establish, held that “a substantial 
number of known errors signals two things: (1) the existence of 
substantial unknown errors; and (2) a lack of quality control.”305 
 
 300. State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749, 774 (Wisc. 2016).  The concurrence objected 
to the denial of the request by the developer of COMPAS to file an amicus brief, 
which underscores the necessity for those challenging automated systems to have 
their own experts and amici supporting their positions. 
 301. See, e.g., Lederman, 47 N.Y.S.3d at 896 (in finding that the state’s use of an 
algorithm was arbitrary and capricious, the court explicitly referenced plaintiff’s 
experts); Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, Local 2415 v. Hous. Indep. Sch. Dist., 251 F. Supp. 
3d 1168, 1177 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (plaintiff’s expert was unable to replicate scoring); 
Stewart, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 24–28 (citing expert testimony about data errors, 
missing data, and scoring abnormalities). 
 302. See K.W. v. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 718 (D. Idaho 2016) (deciding 
that a dispute between experts as to the unreliability of a budgeting algorithm makes 
summary judgment inappropriate). 
 303. See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 135, at 543; Erin Murphy, Databases, 
Doctrine, and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 803, 823–24 
(noting that the presumption of regularity means that absent affirmative evidence to 
the contrary, courts will assume the soundness of the information generated). 
 304. See Logan & Ferguson, supra note 135, at 608–09 (suggesting that courts 
could adopt the position that unaccredited databases lose the presumption of 
reliability). 
 305. Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 711.  The court also noted that sixty-six percent 
of original training data had to be discarded because of data error and that the state 
failed to audit the system after implementation even though it knew the extent of the 
data error.  Id.; see also Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1177 (providing a 
418 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVI 
Advocates should also aggressively challenge claims that 
information about the technology cannot be released because it is 
proprietary, protected by a NDA, or is otherwise privileged.  While 
some courts have refused to require third parties to reveal proprietary 
information,306 several others have made it clear that such claims are 
outweighed by a plaintiff’s due process rights.307  As one court stated, 
a private company’s “trade secrets do not empower, much less 
compel,” a government agency “to violate the constitutional rights of 
its employees.”308  The court importantly went on to state: “When a 
public agency adopts a policy of making high stakes employment 
decisions based on secret algorithms incompatible with minimum due 
process, the proper remedy is to overturn the policy, while leaving the 
trade secrets intact.”309 
Advocates would also do well to leverage language indicating 
judicial concern about algorithmic decision-making systems in 
general.  Given how new, complex, nontransparent, and potentially 
harmful predictive algorithms are, courts have been willing to look 
beyond their own jurisdiction for guidance.  In the challenge to New 
Mexico’s teacher assessment system, the State, seeking a dismissal, 
cited a number of cases from other jurisdictions that had upheld 
similar systems on equal protection and substantive due process 
grounds.310  The New Mexico court noted that the challenge at bar 
was explicitly based on a state statute.311  The court then used dicta 
from several of the opinions the state had cited to find that while 
 
myriad of reasons why algorithmic scores might be erroneously calculated, and notes 
further that even when mistakes are found, that they will not be promptly corrected); 
State of New Mexico ex rel. Stewart v. N.M. Pub. Educ. Dep’t, D-101-CV-2015-
00409, at 24–27 (Santa Fe County Ct. Dec. 2, 2015) (listing errors in the data the 
algorithm was analyzing). 
 306. See generally State v. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wisc. 2016).  In Loomis the 
defendant argued that he was denied the information the sentencing court relied on 
because the developer of the algorithmic scoring system considered the information 
proprietary and would not release it.  Id. at 761.  The court found that because the 
defendant had access to the questions and defendant’s answers to the algorithm 
evaluated, the defendant had enough of the information.  The court did require that 
going forward trial court judges must be told that the proprietary nature of COMPAS 
prevents disclosure of how factors are weighed and risk scores determined for both 
courts and defendants even as the questions and answers the system assesses are 
released.  Id. at 769–70. 
 307. See, e.g., Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d at 717–18.  The court also noted that any 
harm to the third party could be mitigated with protective orders.  Id. at 718. 
 308. Hous. Fed’n of Teachers, 251 F. Supp. 3d at 1179. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Stewart, D-101-CV-2015-00409, at 15–16. 
 311. Id. at 17. 
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those systems may have passed the low bar of constitutional rational 
basis review, courts viewed those systems as untested, unfair, and 
problematic.312  Even in Loomis, which upheld use of the assessment 
tool in Wisconsin, the court provided cautionary language and 
restrictions that can be used by advocates challenging other 
algorithmic assessment systems.313 
However, confronting the many issues raised by governmental use 
of predictive analytics likely exceeds the capacity of litigation based 
on current legal doctrines and statutes.  Addressing the potential 
injustices of predictive algorithms can involve pursuing the hard work 
of legal reform.314  The language and spirit of well drafted statutes, 
regulations, and ordinances can provide legal advocates and 
grassroots activists with the tools to challenge these powerful but 
fallible systems. 
B.  Regulation 
Regulation,315 through local ordinances or state statutes, can go far 
in addressing the lack of transparency that results from government 
secrecy or third-party claims of proprietary protections.  Regulations 
can also provide mechanisms to challenge database errors, and can 
require much needed algorithmic testing and auditing.  Law not only 
guides government agencies, it provides a foothold for litigation to 
keep those agencies in check.  While marginalized populations will 
always be targets of state authority, public policy, including rule-
 
 312. Id. at 16–17 (“Needless to say, this Court would be hard-pressed to find 
anyone who would find this evaluation system fair to non-FCAT teachers, let alone 
be willing to submit to a similar evaluation system.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 313. See supra note 269 and accompanying text (describing the holding in State v. 
Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016)). 
 314. Frank Pasquale & Danielle Keats Citron, Promoting Innovation While 
Preventing Discrimination: Policy Goals for the Scored Society, 89 WASH. L. REV. 
1413, 1413 (2014). 
 315. A comprehensive discussion of the myriad of regulations potentially 
applicable to governmental algorithmic decision making is far beyond the scope of 
this Article.  For example, overarching national legislation similar to the European 
Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) could address many of the 
issues discussed in Part II.  See generally Francoise Gilbert et al., Corporate 
Governance in Insurance: The EU General Data Protection Regulation and Its 
Implications for United States Companies, GREENBERGTRAURIG (Aug. 3, 2018), 
https://www.gtlaw.com/en/insights/2018/12/published-articles/the-eu-general-data-
protection-regulation-and-its-implications-for-united-states-companies 
[https://perma.cc/43J2-TPGW ] (providing a brief overview of the GDPR).  However, 
in the current political climate, national legislation regulating use of big data analytics 
seems unlikely. 
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making in its broadest sense, can shape and shift the balance of power 
in civil society.316 
Technologies that remain secret are unchallengeable.  To combat 
this secrecy, communities are beginning to pass local ordinances that 
require law enforcement to provide notice to local legislators and the 
community before acquiring and deploying new surveillance 
technologies.317  These ordinances require such notice regardless of 
whether the systems are purchased, provided by grants, or even gifted 
to an agency free of charge.318  Unfortunately, without careful 
monitoring, governments may attempt to side-step regulations meant 
to ensure transparency and public access.319 
Ordinances can also require agencies to provide annual reports 
about the technologies being deployed or considered by law 
enforcement.320  Additionally, ordinances can provide more formal 
mechanisms for public input.  One ordinance, passed in Oakland, 
California, went beyond requiring community notification — it 
created standing oversight committees to address police surveillance 
and technology, with some seats reserved for members of the 
public.321  Such laws are critical not only because they mandate notice 
and input, but also because they provide structures that facilitate 
community engagement.322 
 
 316. See K. Sabeel Rahman, Policy Making as Power-Building, 27 S. CAL. 
INTERDISC. L.J. 315, 318 (2018). 
 317. See Crump, supra note 65, at 1605 (discussing local procurement ordinances in 
Seattle, San Diego and Oakland); Joh, supra note 58, at 127 (observing that Santa 
Clara County became the first county in the nation to require government approval 
prior to engaging new surveillance tools). 
 318. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 65, at 1614 (noting that Seattle’s procurement 
ordinance requires that any city department obtain City Council approval prior to 
acquiring surveillance technology and again prior to deployment). 
 319. Seattle’s police department secretly purchased technology to create a 
database of social media postings in contravention of Seattle’s surveillance ordinance. 
See Ansel Herz, How the Seattle Police Secretly—and Illegally—Purchased a Tool 
for Tracking Your Social Media Posts, STRANGER (Sept. 28, 2016) 
https://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/09/28/24585899/how-the-seattle-police-
secretlyand-illegallypurchased-a-tool-for-tracking-your-social-media-posts 
[https://perma.cc/C3WH-XEFE]. 
 320. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 188. 
 321. See Crump, supra note 65, at 1626. 
 322. These are similar to the structures provided by consent decrees. See Sunita 
Patel, Toward Democratic Police Reform: A Vision for “Community Engagement” 
Provisions in DOJ Consent Decrees, 51 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793, 796 (2016) 
(noting that structures created by consent decrees requiring public input have 
increased transparency of and oversight over local law enforcement). 
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Regulations aimed at increasing local law enforcement 
transparency arose because police were purchasing and implementing 
predictive systems in secret.323  Laws mandating transparency in 
public purchasing already bind state agencies that oversee public 
benefits programs.324 Thus, the problem with automated public 
benefits systems is not that they are purchased in secret, it is that  the 
systems themselves are opaque, the data sets contain errors and bias, 
and error rates are hidden from the public.325  This lack of 
transparency is often aggravated by contractual NDAs or claims that 
the information is proprietary.326 
The intermingling of public, private, and law enforcement data into 
large data sets makes assessing the data for accuracy and 
completeness difficult.  However, there are existing statutes and 
regulatory structures that could provide a framework for individuals 
to inspect and correct inaccurate data.327  The federal Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA),328 for example, provides consumers with the 
right to inspect and challenge their credit records for data error.329  
Similarly, the federal government has data control requirements, 
including expungement of overturned convictions, for large unwieldy 
databases like the combined DNA profile database.330  There is also 
 
 323. Crump, supra note 65, at 1604–05 (describing case studies suggesting that 
police departments often acquire surveillance technologies without participation by 
elected officials or the community); see also supra notes 61–68 and accompanying 
text (providing examples of how police departments have concealed predictive 
policing systems). 
 324. See, e.g., Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 109–10 (indicating that most 
states have public records laws mandating disclosure of contracts with third-party 
vendors); Natalie Gomez-Velez, Proactive Procurement: Using New York City’s 
Procurement Rules to Foster Positive Human Services Policies and Serve Public 
Goals, 9 CUNY L. REV. 331, 350–51 (2006) (describing New York City’s 
procurement rules, which require open, competitive bidding, as applying to contracts 
for the provision of social services). 
 325. See supra Part I. 
 326. See supra notes 241–43 and accompanying text. 
 327. See Citron & Pasquale, supra note 248, at 20–21 (arguing that the private use 
of algorithmic scoring requires that once firms have gathered data on more than 2000 
individuals, those individuals should have the same rights to inspect, correct, and 
dispute inaccurate data as those provided by the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act). 
 328. 15 U.S.C. § 1561 et seq. 
 329. Citron & Pasquale, supra note 248, at 16.  This is not to say the FCRA system 
works well; indeed, it has been described as a “kafkaesque no man’s land that, more 
often than not, fails to resolve the problem.”  Madden et al., supra note 29, at 87. 
 330. Logan & Ferguson, supra note 135, at 551, 600 (suggesting that while the 
statutes require systematic data correction for all agencies that access CODIS, a 
comprehensive DNA profile database accessible by all levels of law enforcement, the 
FBI (which manages the database) has been lacking in its upkeep of data quality). 
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the federal e-verify system, which is used to police who may or may 
not legally work.331  This system has been plagued with data errors 
that raise real barriers to employment.332  But e-verify does have an 
online self-check system, which allows for some ability to challenge 
data errors.333  While none of these systems work exceedingly well, 
each provides some process for addressing and potentially correcting 
data error — they can serve as guides for legislation that will address 
errors in other types of data sets. 
Regulating agency contract requirements can also increase system 
transparency by limiting third-party NDAs or claims that the 
technology is proprietary.  When jurisdictions demand fewer and 
narrower NDAs, third-party vendors often comply.334  In addition, 
regulations that govern contracts for algorithmic decision-making 
technologies can mandate that all the results from validation testing 
conducted prior to implementation be made public, and, more 
importantly, that post-implementation testing and auditing be made 
public as well.335  Support for these transparency and accuracy 
requirements comes not only from case law, but also from statutes 
governing the doctrinal areas these systems function within.336 
Attempts to regulate and limit government use of algorithmic 
decision-making technologies will not be easy.  Litigation and law 
reform, while critical to minimizing the harm these tools can cause, 
are not standalone solutions.  Both rely on community activism and 
long-term grassroots organizing to be effective. 
 
 331. See About E-Verify, https://www.e-verify.gov [https://perma.cc/ZE9Q-FKCP] 
(describing E-verify as a web-based system that allows enrolled employers to confirm 
the eligibility of their employees to work in the United States). 
 332. Hu, supra note 156, at 1778. 
 333. Id. at 1764–66. 
 334. Brauneis & Goodman, supra note 95, at 164–66 (discussing successful usage of 
contract language to limit trade secret and NDA claims). 
 335. Id.  These requirements will increase costs but will also minimize adoption of 
error prone systems and the litigation that follows.  The need for testing and the 
implications of systemic system failure is not unnoticed by courts.  See K.W. v. 
Armstrong, 180 F. Supp. 3d 703, 714 (D. Idaho 2016) (noting that given the failure 
rates of the system, a premium should have been put on testing it in the first place); 
Zynda v. Arwood, 175 F. Supp. 3d 791, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (concluding that the 
high error rate in an unemployment fraud detection system supports standing for 
legal services office). 
 336. See supra note 292–94 and accompanying text (discussing statutes requiring 
assessment systems be valid, transparent, and objective). 
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C.  Activism and Organizing 
Social control algorithms are impoverished and impoverishing.  
Challenging them requires an engaged community knowledgeable 
about their fallibility and willing to establish coalitions to confront 
them.  Most importantly, it requires expanding the current focus on 
law enforcement technologies to include all of the systems used to 
control and punish people.  Governmental deployment of data 
analytics to manage marginalized populations is a political decision, 
albeit one that reframes large political questions as “mundane issues 
of efficiency and systems engineering.”337  Confronting such 
dangerous politics requires prolonged and aggressive advocacy. 
Some see government use of algorithmic social control tools as a 
fait accompli and focus on how to cabin and tweak the technology to 
minimize its harm.338  Others call for more aggressive tactics, folding 
challenges to governmental use of algorithmic decision-making into a 
larger fight for social justice.339  As they are used today, predictive 
technologies are destructive not only to individuals, but also to the 
very concepts of equality and justice.  Additionally, once these 
technologies become acceptable as tools to manage any one 
population, it will be much harder to challenge its use to control 
others.  As in any battle for civil rights and equity, a wide range of 
approaches and tactics will be necessary.  However, given the 
complexity of predictive analytics, thorough community education is a 
critical first step. 
Education is central in large part because predictive algorithm 
systems have flourished in secret, which has allowed their use to go 
undetected and unchallenged for extended periods of time.  The more 
communities and advocates understand predictive algorithm systems 
and how they are used, the easier it will be to identify when they are 
deployed.  The more people learn about the fallibilities inherent in 
predictive analytics — the biases, feedback loops, erroneous data, and 
unchecked, undemocratic power hidden within them — the easier it 
will be to challenge unquestioning societal acceptance of predictive 
 
 337. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 197.  Governmental use of the social control 
technology can be seen as political because it reflects a choice of where to focus 
public resources and because purchasing tools specifically designed to control 
unpopular groups furthers a particularly neoliberal politic. 
 338. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 6, 187–88. 
 339. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 204–05. 
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technologies.  Community education is also necessary to maintain 
what is bound to be an ongoing, long-term battle.340 
Education can also support calls to repurpose predictive systems.  
Instead of being used to target and control, the technology could be 
used to help and uplift vulnerable populations.  Big data analytics can 
be used to identify risks to a community, but instead of addressing 
those risks through law enforcement, other social service systems 
could be employed.341  Similarly, predictive technology could be used 
to ensure that the poor and families in distress receive all the benefits 
to which they are entitled.342  These systems can also be repurposed 
to strengthen judicial oversight of warrant requests,343 or to identify 
police officers with poor decision-making skills so they can go 
through additional training.344  Thus, education is key to creating the 
necessary narratives to challenge how, and for what purpose, 
governments use predictive analytics. 
This is not a new fight — there have already been many 
successes,345 and organizing and advocacy is ongoing.346  However, 
 
 340. See Crump, supra note 65, at 1628–29 (noting that the success of Oakland’s 
citizen task force requires high levels of community involvement, which is supported 
by Oakland’s long tradition of activism — indeed, communities without that history 
may have difficulty sustaining similar levels of input and engagement). 
 341. THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, supra note 6, at 170–71 (discussing how 
systems could augment a public health approach to social ills by decoupling risk 
identification from a policing solution). 
 342. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 81–82. 
 343. Andrew Manual Crespo, Systemic Facts: Toward Institutional Awareness in 
Criminal Courts, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2074–76 (2016) (describing the capacity of 
algorithms to help courts identify, track and assess the accuracy of the probable cause 
scripts used to support warrant requests). 
 344. Studies show that applying predictive analytics to internal police data can 
identify which officers are more likely to make bad decisions or have inappropriate 
use of force complaints made against them. See THE RISE OF BIG DATA POLICING, 
supra note 6, at 147–48. 
 345. See, e.g., EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 64–72 (arguing that grassroots organizing 
is key to stopping attempts at privatizing benefits systems); see also Michele Gilman 
& Rebecca Green, The Surveillance Gap: The Harms of Extreme Privacy and Data 
Marginalization, 42 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 253, 303–04 (2018) (describing 
how Seattle’s homeless population successfully fought the city’s mandatory data 
collection program). 
 346. One example of ongoing advocacy is the Stop LA Spying Coalition, which 
provides community outreach and joins legal challenges to stop predictive policing 
campaigns in Los Angeles and elsewhere. About Us, STOP LAPD SPYING COAL., 
https://stoplapdspying.org/about-slsc/ [https://perma.cc/DKT6-WV34]. Another 
example is Our Data Bodies: Human Rights and Data Justice, which works with local 
communities to show how different data systems impact reentry, fair housing, public 
assistance, and community development. See Our Data Bodies: Human Rights and 
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most of the current organizing is framed as a civil liberties issue, 
focusing on surveillance and predictive policing technologies.347  This 
is worrisome, as it allows other governmental use of these systems to 
escape scrutiny.  It is critical for advocates to realize that predictive 
technologies used by government share a commonality of 
consequences,348 that they target the same populations regardless of 
which agencies are involved.  State violence against marginalized 
populations is not just police violence, it is the violence of being 
policed and controlled by opaque and unchallengeable tools, 
regardless of the context. 
While organizing is never easy, especially across race and class,349 
the technology itself is conducive to the creation of broad alliances.  
The analytics and databases used in predictive policing are similar to 
those used to target and control Medicaid recipients or families mired 
in the child welfare system.  The predictive analytics used to assess 
eligibility for unemployment are similar to those used to asses teacher 
competency.  The problems with predictive technologies, including 
failure rates, biased feedback loops, data errors, and lack of 
transparency, are all the same.  Organizing around the similarities of 
the systems that governments use to control and manage people can 
strengthen and speed coalition building. 
Readers, especially those from a legal background, may avoid 
consciously engaging with calls for social justice organizing.  Many 
within the legal system tend to rely on legal strategies and the drafting 
of laws and regulations to address social concerns.  However, 
Eubanks’s description of how these systems create and maintain a 
digital poorhouse should cause all of us to stop and realize that 
 
Data Justice, ODB PROJECT, https://www.odbproject.org [https://perma.cc/EM9Q-
P8PU]. 
 347. See, e.g., ACLU COMMUNITY CONTROL OVER POLICE SURVEILLANCE 
(CCOPS) MODEL BILL, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/files/communitycontrol/ACLU-
Local-Surveillance-Technology-Model-City-Council-Bill-January-2017.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GKN5-L7UK] (providing a model act to “Promote Transparency 
and Protect Civil Rights and Civil Liberties with Respect to Surveillance 
Technologies”). While the model act has a broad definition of “surveillance 
technology,” which includes “software designed to integrate or analyze data from 
Surveillance Technology,” it is unlikely it would encompass the types of algorithmic 
decision-making systems used to assess and regulate public benefits or sentencing 
algorithms. Id. § 12(E)(1)(q). 
 348. Hu, supra note 156, at 1740. 
 349. See EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 216.  Pointing out the “deep classism” of many 
progressive organizations that inhibits coalition building, which actually results in 
progress for the poor. 
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surveillance and data collection, which is now used to police the poor, 
will be turned on others once it is perfected: 
Think of the digital poorhouse as an invisible spider web woven of 
fiber optic strands.  Each strand functions as a microphone, a 
camera, a fingerprint scanner, a GPS tracker, and alarm trip wire, 
and a crystal ball.  Some of the strands are sticky.  They are 
interconnected, creating a network that moves petabytes of data.  
Our movements vibrate the web, disclosing our location and 
direction.  Each of those filaments can be switched on or off.  They 
reach back in history and forward into the future.  They connect us 
in a network of association to those we know and love.  As you go 
down the socioeconomic scale, the strands are woven more densely 
and more of them are switched on.350 
Clearly, we are not individually in charge of the systems that create 
this web and cannot easily switch the strands on or off.  Because the 
criminal justice and social welfare systems are fused, to successfully 
challenge the use of advanced technologies in one arena requires 
challenging them in all arenas.  This means that advocates must 
organize around issues of poverty and disability as well as surveillance 
and predictive policing.  Dismantling any part of the digital 
poorhouse means asking not just whether the technology will increase 
surveillance by the state or displace probable cause — it means asking 
why we have a digital poorhouse in the first place. 
CONCLUSION 
We live in a country where marginalized populations are seen as 
problematic, a people to be contained and controlled rather than as 
equal citizens.  We also live with a justice system that has historically 
been used to police race and poverty.  These historic patterns are 
being re-codified in a technological redlining that reinforces 
oppressive social relationships and enacts new models of profiling and 
policing.351  Misguided government reliance on flawed algorithms as 
social control mechanisms endangers vulnerable populations and 
impoverishes our country. 
As our legal system becomes ever more intertwined in big data 
analytics, advocates must learn to recognize the harms caused by 
these technologies and think creatively about how to oppose them.  
Challenging governmental deployment of social control technologies 
will require melding social activism with pragmatic legal and 
 
 350. EUBANKS, supra note 6, at 188–89. 
 351. See NOBLE, supra note 7, at 1. 
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legislative advocacy.  Only then will we be able to untangle our 
clients, ourselves, and ultimately our democracy from their grasp. 
